A Universal United Nations: Fifteenth report [of the] Commission to Study the Organization of Peace by Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements 
1-1-1962 
A Universal United Nations: Fifteenth report [of the] Commission 
to Study the Organization of Peace 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in PRISM: Political 
& Rights Issues & Social Movements by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact 
STARS@ucf.edu. 
Recommended Citation 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, "A Universal United Nations: Fifteenth report [of the] 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace" (1962). PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social 
Movements. 556. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism/556 
A UNIVERSAL UNITED NATIONS 
FIFTEENTH REPORT 
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE 
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, Chairman 
345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y. 
Single Copy Fifty Cents 
July 1962 
COMMISSION TO STUDY 
THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE 
• 
Research Affiliate of the 
American Association for the United Nations 
Honorary Chairman 
JAMES T. SHOTWELL 
Chairman 
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE 
• 
Executive Committee 
CLARENCE A. BERDAHL 
INIS L.· CLAUDE, JR. 
BENJAMIN V. COHEN 
OSCAR A. DE LIMA 
CLARK M. EICHELBERGER 
LELAND M. GOODRICH 
CHARLES C. PRICE 
JAMES P. WARBURG 
RICHARD R. WOOD 
QUINCY WRIGHT 
T ABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
FOREWORD 5 
FIFTEENTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
Part I Need for a Universal United Nations 9 
Part II Switzerland 14 
Part III Germany 15 
Part IV China 19 
Part V Korea and Vietnam 23 
Part VI Liberated Colonies 25 
Part VII United States Policy 30 
Part VIII ANew View of an Old American Goal 40 
ApPENDICES 
A. Legal Obstacles to Universal Membership 
by Quincy Wright 51 
B. Distribution of votes in the Sixteenth General 
Assembly on Some Leading Roll-calls 59 

FOREWORD 
We Americans like to think of ourselves as a peace-loving peo-
ple. We believe that our record in world politics supports this 
view of ourselves. We cite our persistent efforts to make a success 
of the United Nations as evidence of our naturally pacific disposi-
tion. 
Unfortunately a love of peace does not automatically ensure the 
success of peace-making and peace-keeping institutions. It.is al-
ways necessary for those who form the institutions to choose 
proper means to the desired end. One of the basic problems in 
making a success of the United Nations is that of its membership. 
Should every independent state be admitted to the Organization? 
Specifically, should states which have not always seemed to be 
peace-loving, or have not been independent long enough to show 
their true character, be admitted to membership? 
These questions are urgent. The failure of the victorious powers 
in World War II to agree upon peace treaties with their principal 
opponents has left the peace itself incomplete and precarious. 
Should Germany, or the two Germanies, be admitted to the United 
Nations? And what government, or governments, should represent 
China, or the two Chinas, in the Organization? And what also of 
the numerous new and untried states which are springing from 
obsolete colonial empires now in full course of liquidation? These 
questions need to be answered before other basic problems, no-
tably that of the role which the United Nations should play in 
contemporary world politics, can be satisfactorily solved. And 
these other problems are also urgent. 
Recent critics of the United Nations, including some leading 
supporters of the proposition that the world needs a general inter-
national organization for peace-making and peace-keeping pur-
poses, question its suitability in its present form for all the work 
that is required of it. One asserts that the world needs also an 
independent concert of free nations to undertake pressing tasks 
which he believes to be beyond the capacity of the United Na-
tions. Another suggests that too much reliance on the United Na-
tions invites disappointment and that great powers, seeking ade-
quate protection for their national interests in this frightening 
age, should make greater use of other international agencies and 
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of the processes of conventional diplomacy. Still other.s contend 
that judgment cannot properly be passed on the performance of 
an intended general international organization which falls as far 
short of universality as does the United Nations / in its present 
form. These supporters of the proposition that the world needs 
an efficient international peace-making and peace-keeping or-
ganization insist that the present crisis calls first for a vigorous 
effort to strengthen the United Nations by making it as soon as 
possible a truly universal organization. 
The worldwide discussion of the two hundred million dollar 
bond issue, authorized at the Sixteenth Session of the General 
Assembly, has caused thoughtful people everywhere to take a 
hard look at the United Nations Organization and make a fresh 
appraisal of its practical utility under the rapidly changing con-
ditions of world politics. The task of appraisal is complicated by 
the unexpected way in which the Organization ·has developed. 
Instead of a consensus of the major powers, which through their 
permanent membership in the Security Council were to supply 
leadership in world politics, there is the Cold War. Instead of a 
return to normality after World War II there is the liquidation 
of colonial empires. Instead of a comforting system of collective 
security there is the arms race and the darkening shadow of a 
third world war. 
On the other hand, the United Nations Organization has been 
unexpectedly serviceable in developing and using new processes 
of peaceful change in this rapidly changing world. This unex-
pected serviceability has been particularly important in connec-
tion with threats to the peace growing out of the liquidation of 
colonial empires, a major political phenomenon in the post-war 
period. If the possibility of peaceful change be a necessary pre-
requisite for peace itself, as may well be believed under the 
exigent circumstances of this troubled age, every effort should ·be 
made to improve the capability of the United Nations to serve 
in this way. We showed in our Fourteenth Report, dealing with 
the role of the Secretariat in world politics, how important it is 
to maintain this capability of the Secretariat, and especially of 
the Secretary-General, for mediation and conciliation in inter-
national disputes. We now think, as this Fifteenth Report shows, 
that a truly· universal United Nations would be capable of serving 
even more effectively as an agency for international mediation 
and conciliation. 
The inclusion of effective spokesmen for all the world's peoples 
in the general international organization will not only expand the 
existin'g facilities for multilateral diplomacy within the framework 
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of the United Nations. It will also maXImIze the possibility of 
peaceful changes in the world. The Organization cannot be made 
universal without at the same time disposing of some of the 
gravest threats to the world's peace. The failure of the major 
powers to finish the task of peace-making imposed upon them 
by their success in World War II has permitted these threats to 
hang over mankind too long. It is time to find out by trying what 
can be done through the United Nations to fill this noxious void. 
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace sees no 
reason for losing faith in the purposes and principles embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations or for relaxing efforts to make 
the Organization a more effective servant of these purposes in 
accordance with these principles. There is much that can be 
done without waiting for a Charter Review Conference, as we 
have shown in previous reports, to strengthen the United Nations 
and improve the organization of peace in this difficult age. The 
time has now come when the most urgent task for those who 
believe in the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter 
is to complete the unfinished work of the World War II peace-
makers by making the United Nations a universal organization. 
How can the United Nations be expected to accomplish its mis-
sion in this troubled world when a quarter of the world's people 
are excluded from it or not effectively represented in it? If the 
peace is to be kept, it must first be made. 
Some readers of the following study in the organization of 
peace may deplore the lack of specific proposals for the solution 
of some of the outstanding peace-making problems. We do not 
suggest, for instance, any particular solution of the German prob-
lem nor even terms for solving the apparently lesser problem of 
Berlin. It should be said here that the prescription of conditions 
upon which peace might be made in any particular area is not 
our present purpose. Weare concerned in this Report with the 
development of a peace-making and peace-keeping process which 
we believe will produce results that should be acceptable to all 
who wish to promote the establishment of a reign of law in inter-
national affairs. 
The proper development of this process calls for a universal 
United Nations. The steps which should be taken toward this end 
now are the topics of this Report. Finishing the transformation 
of the United Nations from a military alliance of the victors in 
the Second World War into a general and complete international 
organization is a necessary means for the further strengthening 
of the organization of the world's peace. 
This Report has been prepared in accordance with our usual 
practice. Our Executive Committee determined its scope and 
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method and timing. A special Drafting Committee prepared a 
first draft of the text, which was carefully reviewed by the Execu-
tive Committee and further revised. Other members of the Com-
mission have contributed helpful advice and drafting assistance. 
The Report's recommendations are approved by those Commission 
members whose names are attached at the end. Reservations by 
some members are duly noted. We are greatly indebted to the 
Fontenay Corporation of New York for financial assistance in the 
preparation of this Report, for which we express our thanks. 
June 1962 
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, Chairman 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace 
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A UNIVERSAL UNITED NATIONS 
I. Need for a Universal United Nations 
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace has always 
believed that the United Nations should be an organization with 
a universal membership. In our Fourth Report, published in 1943, 
we expressed the opinion that "the erection of a universal struc-
ture of law and order" had become a matter of practical politics. 
Our program for immediate action began with the proposition that 
uthe United Nations and their associates should proceed now to 
establish the general international organization. It should provide 
for eventual participation by all nations capable of fulfilling their 
responsibilities." (See our Fourth Report, uFundamentals,~~ p.25. ) 
Capacity to fulfill the responsibilities of membership was the only 
qualification specified in our original plan for admission to the 
permanent United Nations Organization. 
The justification of this program was a matter to which the 
members of our Commission had given much thought. The real 
difficulty in erecting a universal structure of law and order, we 
then believed, H does not lie in any fundamental disagreement 
among thoughtful people as to what such an organization should 
be like. It lies in the doubt as to whether the nations of the world 
today are ready and willing to accept the responsibility of mem-
bership in an international system which secures peace by denying 
the eldest attribute of sovereignty, the right to go to war." We 
knew that it was idle to erect a system unless it would work, and 
that political organizations do not work, or at least work badly, 
unless they are supported by mutual confidence and good will. We 
recognized that the then Axis Powers were not qualified for an 
immediate part in a general international organization: to secure 
the peace. 
We were clear in our own minds, however, that a permanent 
United Nations Organization must eventually be a universal or-
ganization. ~~Any plan for world organization is destined to betray 
the very purpose for which it is made," we declared, '~unless it is 
so drawn that those nations which are held back from participa-
tion in it at first shall, nevertheless, immediately become subject 
to its jurisdiction and may look forward ultimately to winning a 
place alongside the others." We did not specify the form of a test 
by which the qualifications of candidates for membership should 
be measured, but we definitely rejected the view that a state with 
a bad record for past aggression would on that account alone be 
permanently disqualified for admission to the Organization~s gov-
erning bodies. 
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The Com'mission to Study the Organization of Peace has never 
changed its position respecting the desirable character of the 
United Nations. In our Tenth Report, .r.rStrengthening the United 
Nations," published in 1957, we declared that "the Commission 
adheres to the fundamental proposition that the United Nations 
should be a universal organization. To this end," we added, .r'we 
believe that all states able to discharge the obligations of member-
ship should be admitted, if they apply." Willingness to apply for 
membership seemed to us acceptable evidence of intent to abide 
by the obligations of membership. Ability to discharge those obli-
gations would be the qualification concerning which the Organiza-
tion would have to exercise a discretionary authority at the time of 
admission. 
In our Eleventh Report, "Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age," 
published in 1959, we dealt with the problem of membership at 
greater length. "We believe," we then wrote, "that every inde-
pendent state should be a member of the United Nations and that 
every government actually in power within such a state should be 
permitted and encouraged to take part in the wotk of the Organi-
zation' thereby clearly acknowledging the obligation to respect the 
provisions of the Charter. The Charter contains the most advanced 
statement of the principles of civilized international relations to 
which states have thus far bound themselve.s by agreement. Uni-
versal acceptance of the obligations incorporated in the Charter is 
the necessary foundation for progress toward world order. Thus 
membership in the United Nations should not be considered sim-
ply as a privilege, but as a solemn responsibility." 
That the erection of a universal structure of law and order had 
become a matter of practical politics was the view also of the four 
founding powers of the permanent United Nations Organization. 
In the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, the United States, 
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China 
joined in declaring "that they recognize the necessity of establish-
ing at the earliest practical date a general international organiza-
tion, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-
loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and 
small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." 
Thus the rule was adopted that membership should be restricted 
to peace-loving states. By peace-loving was meant, as the event 
showed, the states which fought in World War II against the Axis 
Powers. 
With the growth of the Organization in its early years the mean-
ing of peace-loving expanded. States which had persisted in guard-
ing their neutrality during the War were admitted to membership 
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without any particular inquiry into the nature of their love for 
peace, and eventually former Axis Powers also were admitted, 
Italy and Austria in 1955 and Japan a year later. Both of the first 
two Secretaries-General, Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjold, were 
earnest advocates of a broad interpretation of the provisions of the 
Charter concerning the qualifications for admission. Lie, in his ill-
starred Twenty-Year Program for Peace, promulgated on the eve 
of the fighting in Korea, dealt with the membership problem in the 
fifth of his proposed Ten Points. Here he bluntly called for pro-
ceeding toward universal membership without mentioning any 
need for investigating the love-life of non-member nations. Ham-
marskjold sponsored no similar Program, but welcomed more than 
forty new members into the Organization with few questions 
asked concerning either their intentions or their capabilities. Inter-
national lawyers might argue about the interpretation of the 
qualifications for membership, but international politicians showed 
little inferest in their arguments. (S~e Quincy Wright, memoran-
dum on Legal Obstacles to Universal Membership. Appendix A.) 
The need for universality, though not clearly seen in 1945 at 
San Francisco, was evident even then to many of the delegates. 
(See Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Ninth Re-
port, published by the Commission, 1955, p. 20.) As early as 1950 
John Foster Dulles, who had taken an active part with the United 
States delegation at San Francisco, confessed that "a growing 
weakness of the United Nations is its lack of universality." He 
added: "I have now come to believe that the United Nations will 
best serve the cause of peace, if its Assembly is representative of 
what the world actually is, and not merely representative of the 
parts which we like." (See his Peace and War, N. Y. 1950, pp. 188, 
190.) This belief follows logically from the four main purposes of 
the United Nations, set forth in Article I of the Charter. It applies 
to the newest Member States, springing from the liquidation of 
colonial empires, as well as to those previously admitted to the 
Org.anization. 
The first of these purposes is to maintain international peace 
and security. To that end the Organization was authorized to take 
various collective measures involving the use of force to ensure 
compliance with the obligations of membership. The Charter fur-
ther provided that even non-members shall act in accordance with 
its principles as far as may be necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. This provision, howeveJ;, is not 
altogether satisfactory, because it seeks to compel independent 
states to observe rules of conduct to which they are not legally 
bound and the United Nations itself should always set a good 
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example of scrupulous respect for law. This difficulty can be 
corrected by the admission of such states to membership in the 
Organization, even weak and politically inexperienced states in 
tropical Africa. 
The Organization was also authorized in furtherance of the first 
of its purposes to bring about by peaceful means adjustments of 
international disputes or settlements of situations which might 
lead to breaches of the peace. Here again the good offices of the 
United Nations should be more acceptable and effective, when 
the Organization is dealing with Member States, because non-
members are under no lawful obligation to utilize its procedures 
of peaceful settlement. The Organization's effectiveness should be 
enhanced by admitting independent states to membership, by no 
means excluding newly liberated states in tropical Africa. In fact 
the experience of the first sixteen years under the Charter shows 
that the mediatory powers of the United Nations are more promis-
ing of satisfactory results than the coercive. As John Foster Dulles 
once wisely observed: "The possibility of peaceful change is the 
fundamental pre-requisite for peace." 
The second of the Organization's purposes is to develop friendly 
relations among nations. Friendly relations, based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, as 
the Charter requires, cannot be assured, if some nations are ex-
cluded from the opportunity to communicate their views, and to 
acquire understanding of the views of others, in the general forum 
of the United Nations. Nations no more than individuals can be 
"civilized" by ostracism. The "practice of tolerance" and the will 
to live "as good neighbors," called for by the Charter, are hardly 
to be expected of states excluded from the "club" and branded as 
inferior. Nor are these desirable attitudes to be expected of Mem-
ber States in their relations to non-members so excluded and 
branded. 
The third purpose is to achieve international cooperation in 
certain specified and important fields of action. Such cooperation 
cannot proceed satisfactorily if some states whose collaboration 
is desired are excluded from discussions proposing cooperative 
action or from participation in the resulting operations. It is true 
that the autonomous position of the Specialized Agencies makes 
it possible for states to limit their cooperation to areas in which 
they may claim an interest, but the Economic and Social Council 
and the General Assembly coordinate the activities of the Spe-
cialized Agencies. Therefore, whatever their particular areas of 
interdependence, all states, including the newest, weakest, and 
most inexperienced, should participate in the United Nations itself. 
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Moreover, the need for universal cooperation is particularly evi-
dent in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The 
essence of these rights and freedoms is the recognition that all 
members of the human race are entitled to enjoy them without 
distinction on account of race, sex, language, or religion. The more 
respect for essential rights is lacking in a state, the more important 
it is that the state should be subject to the obligations of the 
Charter and the scrutiny of the Organization. 
The need for universal cooperation is likewise evident in the 
fields of nuclear testing, arms control, and disarmament. Such 
cooperation can best be promoted by membership in the United 
Nations, which commits its members to discussion of the princi-
ples of disarmament in the General Assembly (Article 11), and to 
the formulation of specific plans for disarmament in the Security 
Council (Article 26). The newly liberated colonial dependencies 
may not be the states whose excessive armaments are most in 
need of limitation, but they are among the states which are most 
eager for effective limitations on the armaments of others. 
Furthermore, there is need for universal cooperation in the de-
velopment and codification of international law. A world rule of 
law implies the collaboration of all states in both the formulation 
and maintenance of legal rules, principles, and standards. While 
non-member states have been invited to conferences for the codi-
fication of international law, as for example the Conference on the 
Regime of the Seas in 1958, the initiation of projects in this field 
takes place in the International Law Commission and the General 
Assembly. Active interest in this work is desirable on the part of 
nations with experience under all kinds of legal systems. Ac-
ceptance of the results of international conferences is bound to 
be uncertain among states which, because of non-membership in 
the United Nations, have not taken an active part in the proceed-
ings. 
The fourth and last of the main purposes of the United Nations 
is to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the 
attainment of common ends. For obvious reasons hostile or merely 
indifferent relations between members and non-members, far from 
being harmonized by discussions among the former in the United 
Nations, are likely to be aggravated by the exclusion of the latter. 
The admission of the newly liberated states is most desirable from 
this point of view. They have been so fortunate in many cases as 
to obtain their freedom without serious fighting and are specially 
interested in developing the opportunities for further peaceful 
changes in their relationships with one another and with the outer 
world. If the purposes of the United Nations are accepted as valid, 
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the admission to membership of all independent states, capable 
of fulfilling their responsibilities under the Charter, is logically 
necessary and proper. 
At the beginning of 1962 there were 104 Member States in the 
United Nations-more than twice the original membership at the 
beginning of 1946-and the attainment of universality was in 
sight. Additional members may be expected from three sources. 
The most productive source is the crop of new states to be raised 
from the dependent territories of obsolete colonial empires in 
process of liquidation. A second source of additional members is 
the group of divided states resulting from the failure of the prin-
cipal victor nations to settle by suitable treaties of peace sundry 
troublesome problems growing out of the defeat of the German 
and Japanese forces in the second World War. Finally, there is 
one member of the former League of Nations, Switzerland, which 
has refused up to now- to accept membership in the United Na-
tions. Altogether there may be more than half a hundred addi-
tional states which will have to be brought into the United Nations 
family in some manner-not necessarily in all cases as full-Hedged 
Member States-if the United Nations is to become a genuinely 
universal organization. 
II. St(Jitzerland 
The problem of Switzerland is the least urgent but most tracta-
ble. This well-governed and prosperous state was an active and 
useful member of the League of Nations. It contributed competent 
and dedicated personnel to the League Secretariat and administra-
tive agencies, as well as able and forward-looking representatives 
to its political leadership. But Swiss participation in the League 
did not prevent the catastropbe of World War II and Swiss states-
manship preserved with great difficulty throughout the War a 
precarious neutrality. The Swiss had little difficulty persuading 
themselves after the War that they could continue to maintain 
their precious neutrality more surely outside than within the 
United Nations. 
Swiss neutrality offers certain advantages to the major powers 
both in war and in peace. The protection of neutral territory may 
be a valuabl~ convenience for various belligerent activities in time 
of war, and in time of peace the good offices of neutral diplomats 
are always available at the call of more powerful nations involved 
in threatening situations and embarrassed by the lack or the in-
adequacy of direct diplomatic contacts. But Swiss statesmen could 
render even greater services as officers of the United Nations. 
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Moreover Swiss contributions to its revenues would be very help-
ful in this trying period of financial stringency. The admission of 
Switzerland would be most welcome to the responsible members 
of the United Nations, if the Swiss could be persuaded to apply 
for membership. 
1. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recom-
mends that greater efforts be made to convince the Swiss that the 
interests of a genuine neutrality can be better served within than 
without the United Nations. Switzerland has always been a sup-
porter of the World Court at The Hague. It has joined most of the 
UN Specialized Agencies, several of which maintain their head-
quarters on Swiss soil. The former League of Nations headquar-
ters in Geneva has been turned over to the United Nations for use 
as its principal branch office in Europe. In ·short, Switzerland is 
already so deeply involved in the activities of the United Nations 
family that membership in the parent Organization itself is a 
logical, and should be an early, culmination of this relationship. 
III. Germany 
The problem of the divided states is both more urgent and more 
difficult. In the case of Germany the problem has been allowed to 
drift too long. When the War ended, the victorious Powers were 
laboring under the spell of the earlier German successes, and 
schemes for the permanent division of the Third Reich .gained 
favorable attention in various quarters. Fears of a revival of Ger-
man military power outweighed hopes for a German contribution 
to the maintenance of international peace and security. But now 
in parts of the West hopes for a German contribution to interna-
tional security outweigh fears of a revival of German military 
power. Western Germany has already been reintegrated, and only 
Russian opposition prevents the completion of the process. 
The potent fact is that the Germans stand at the cross-roads 
between the way of-the Past and the way of the Future. The way 
of the Past was called Nationalism, and it once formed the broad 
high road between obsolescent monarchies, which were clearly 
destined to pass away, and more vigorous democratic states, which 
promised to usher in what we used to call modern times. But 
Nationalism has done its work in this part of the world, and in 
the extreme form which it took under Hitler's misguided leader-
ship demonstrated its unfitness for an essential task of the present 
time, the building of larger political entities capable of managing 
the bigger problems of this nuclear and electronic age. It is time 
for the Germans to choose between renewing the dreams of the 
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republicans of 1848, and the fresh visions of their modern succes-
sors, who will settle for nothing short of European, or at least West 
European, Union. Would the contemporary Germans really be 
content with the completion of the task, which Bismarck only 
partially performed and Hitler botched, or would they prefer to 
be leading members of a wider political community, based on the 
further development of the European Coal and Steel, the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy, and the European Economic ("Common 
Market") communities? 
Noone can confidently predict the future of the German people. 
History offers to the political prognosticator uncertain guidance 
based on imperfect analogies. In the case of the Germans there is 
the analogy of their close relatives and neighbors, the Nether-
landers, long better known as the Dutch and the Flemish. Once 
united as members of the Holy Roman Empire, they were even-
tually separated by the Protestant Reformation, the rise of the 
Dutch Republic, and the Westphalian Treaties at the close of the 
Thirty Years War, and the Flemish became associated with the 
French-speaking Walloons. Reunited at the close of the Napo-
leonic Wars by the Congress of Vienna, they could not long en-
dure a close association and again broke in two parts, the modern 
N ether lands and another part for which a name had to be filched 
from classical antiquity. Now Belgium and the Netherlands are 
growing closer together again in the new Common Market and 
allied communities, to which the West Germans have also ad-
hered. They all seem to be following a natural principle of politi-
cal order. Outsiders with their own special interests should inter-
fere as little as possible. Let the peoples of modem Germany be 
free to make their own decisions in matters that primarily concern 
themselves. 
American policy in recent years has favored the closer organiza-
tion of Western Europe. The Marshall Plan produced the Organi-
zation for European Economic Cooperation, replaced in Septem-
ber 1961 by the new Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. NATO produced the drive for a European Defense 
Community, frustrated by French resistance. But the Coal and 
Steel Community, the Atomic Energy Community, and the Eco-
nomic Community (the "Common Market") are flourishing. The 
West Germans, who belong to all these communities, may look 
forward to a brilliant future as a leader in a gradual evolution 
toward an integrated political community, which would make 
Western Europe a new superpower of major importance in this 
rapidly changing world. 
Americans cannot afford to take an inflexible attitude toward 
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the problem of Germany. We are pledged under the United Na-
tions Charter to seek peaceful solutions to our international prob-
lems; we cannot have recourse to war as an instrument of Ameri-
can policy for Germany; we cannot permit the Germans to try to 
settle their problem by force. The possibility of peaceful change 
is the primary prerequisite for a satisfactory solution of the Ger-
man problem. The American task is to help create the conditions 
under which it may be possible for the Germans to settle their 
mutual political relations peacefully and primarily in their own 
interest without undue concern for the fears or hopes of more 
heavily armed Powers with their own security primarily in mind. 
This task can best be accomplished through the United Nations. 
American influence there should be thrown in favor of bringing 
Germany, or the two Germanies, into the United Nations. The 
Security Council should have an opportunity to recommend, and 
the General Assembly to decide, its or their admission. Which it 
should be, one or two Germanies, is a determination that can best 
be reached through the processes of parliamentary diplomacy. The 
genuine devotion of many Members of the United Nations to its 
purposes and their firm belief in its principles create an atmos-
phere favorable to a political rather than a military solution of the 
problem. All the major powers will have an equal opportunity to 
get the German problem settled consistently with their interest in 
the maintenance of peace and security. The sooner Germany, or 
the two Germanies, are brought into the United Nations, and 
become subject to the obligations of membership, the less the 
danger that this highly flammable situation will burst into hot war. 
The universal interest in keeping the peace must be made to pre-
vail over the special interests of the various states concerned with 
the German problem. 
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace is aware 
that a. strong case can be made for either of the suggested solu-
tions of the German problem. A unified Germany would have to 
be a politically non-aligned Germany, if the consent of all the 
major powers were to be secured for that solution. What this 
might mean may be conje.ctured from the record of Switzerland 
in the League of Nations and from that of Austria in the United 
Nations. The Austrians in recent years, like the Swiss formerly, 
have shown that representatives of a non-aligned Member State 
can render useful service in a general international organization. 
A non-aligned Germany, it might be argued, should become an 
even more valuable member of the United Na,tions than Austria 
or Switzerland. 
Significant proposals for the reunification and non-alignment of 
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Germany have generally been accompanied by proposals for the 
similar treatment of other Central European States, already mem-
bers of the United Nations. The plan suggested by the Polish 
Foreign Minister, Rapacki, in 1957, and the similar plans put for-
ward by the British Labour Party Leader, Hugh Gaitskell, and 
the American diplomat and historian, George F. Kennan, all pro-
vided for the non-alignment of other Member States on the broad 
border between the Soviet Union and Western Europe. These 
plans also contemplated readjustment of the relations between the 
non-aligned Member States and the military alliances to which 
they respectively belonged. Such readjustments could not be made 
without disturbing, or threatening to disturb, the relations be-
tween the alliances themselves. Eminent statesmen of the Major 
Powers seemed unable to make up their minds whether the hoped-
for strengthening of the United Nations and enhanced security of 
Europe would be more or less than a fair equivalent for the ex-
pected weakening of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Alliance. 
The alternative solution of the German problem would involve 
less disturbance of the arrangements of Major Power statesmen, 
but greater injury to the feelings of patriotic Germans. The pos-
sibly indefinite prolongation of the separation of East and West 
Germany would seem to be a high price to pay for the privilege 
of freely negotiating a reunion of the two parts of the country, 
when the use of force would be excluded and no easily workable 
process of peaceful change would be available. Moreover, eminent 
Major Power statesmen have been unable to decide whether put-
ting an end to the risk of hot war breaking out by mischance in 
Berlin offered acceptable compensation for abandoning hope of 
making the whole of Germany communist or non-communist, as 
the case might be. Nevertheless, admission of the two Germanies 
to the United Nations would facilitate the process of settlement 
by parliamentary diplomacy, while securing to both parts of the 
German people all the solid advantages flowing from membership 
in the world organization. It would also enable harassed Major 
Power statesmen to share the responsibility for finding a solution 
of the German problem with the representatives of Member States 
better situated for the exacting business of international media-
tion and conciliation. 
2. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recom-
mends that the German problem be referred to the United Na-
tions. Our Commission recognizes that German unification is not 
likely to be realized in the near future. But it is convinced that 
the time has come for the United Nations to take a hand in the 
search for a solution. Whether there shall be for the near future 
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two Germanies or one is a question which has waited too long for 
an answer. The Security Council should inquire into the advisa-
bility and possibility of admi·tting a reunited Germany, or the two 
Germanies, to membership and should recommend appropriate 
action to the General Assembly. 
IV. China 
The problem of China also has been allowed to drift too long. 
Like the German problem that of China involves the division of 
a once powerful country, inhabited by a proud people, eager to 
regain for themselves a suitable position in the world. But there 
are important differences between the problems of the two peo-
ples. China, unlike Germany, is already a member of the United 
Nations, and possesses one of the permanent seats in the Security 
Council. The question is, which of two Chinese Governments is 
entitled to sit in the Security Council and in the General Assembly, 
and enjoy the rights and privileges of a Major Power. 
The problem of China, again unlike that of Germany, grew 
out of victory, not defeat, in the second World War. The Province 
of Taiwan, or Formosa, taken from China by Japan in 1895, had 
been promised to China by her allies as one of the fruits of victory, 
and was in fact duly yielded by the Japanese after their defeat, 
although Japan retained formal title until renounced, without 
specifying to whom, by the peace treaty which went into force in 
1951. But which Government is entitled to recognition as the 
government of China, the Nationalist Government which, losing 
effective control of the mainland to the Communists in the civil 
war, took refuge on the island, or the Communist Government, 
which has actually ruled the mainland since 1949? After 1950 
possession of Taiwan by the Nationalist Government was guar-
anteed by the Government of the United States, which was un-
willing that the island should become a military base of the 
Communist Government after the latter's intervention in the in-
ternational police operation in Korea. But is Taiwan an integral 
part of China, or is it an autonomous territory, pending a final 
settlement of all the international disputes in the general area 
of East Asia? 
There is another important difference between the circum-
stances of the two problems. In Germany a settlement acceptable 
to the United States could easily be reached by a popular plebi-
scite. A majority of the Germans would favor a unified republic 
under a non-communist government. But in China the Nationalist 
Government has clearly lost the mandate of Heaven, as the tradi-
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tional Chinese expression runs. In Germany the interests of the 
United States call for recognizing the right of a majority to deter-
mine the political complexion of the whole country, but in China 
American interests seem to call for protecting ·the right of the 
people in Taiwan to determine the political complexion of their 
particular part of the country. Under these circumstances the 
Government of the United States finds itself in a real dilemma. 
Consistency would require the adoption.of the same policy in the 
West and in the East. Inconsistency would be more agreeable to 
American interests, but would make fewer friends among the 
nations and diminish American influence in world politics. The 
German problem could at least be kept out of the United Nations. 
The Chinese problem came up . at each session of the General 
Assembly, where consideration of the Communist Government's 
claim to the seat occupied by the Nationalist~ was regularly in 
order, and with increasing difficulty the American Government 
managed to keep it off the agenda. But this was merely an evasion, 
not a settlement, of the problem. 
The Kennedy Administration wisely abandoned this policy of 
evasion. Consideration of proposed solutions of the problem of 
China on their merits showed that there were more than two 
sides of the problem. First, the Communist Government in power 
on the mainland might be recognized as the legitimate repre-
sentative of China in the United Nations. Secondly, the Nation-
alist Government in exile on Taiwan might continue to be re-
garded as the de jure, if not the de facto, government of the 
country, entitled to retain its place in the Security Council and 
General Assembly. Thirdly, the Taiwan regime might be ac-
cepted as an autonomous region within the Chinese Republic, 
or an independent state, with a vote in the G; neral Assembly in 
addition to that of Mainland China. 
The case for the first solution was presented . by the British 
Government when in 1949 it recognized the Communist Govern-
ment at Peking as the lawful government of the country. It was 
excessively unrealistic, the British contended, to continue to recog-
nize the Nationalist regime as the Government of China, when it 
no longer possessed any authority on the mainland. Moreover, 
ignoring the legal existence of the Peking Government was too 
inconvenient, when for instance negotiations were necessary in 
order to secure the release of missionaries and others detained in 
Chinese Communist prisons. It became dangerous, the British 
argument continued, and might easily have led to- war, when the 
United States intervened with its fleet for the purpose of protect-
ing Taiwan against forcible subjection to the authority of Peking. 
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Finally, it was a formidable obstacle in the way of general agree-
ment upon the limitation and reduction of armaments and other 
enlightened measures which were demanded by the true interests 
of the West. 
The people living under the rule of the Peking Government, 
constituting between a quarter and a fifth of all mankind, are an 
indispensable part of the world community, for which the United 
Nations with its forward-looking Charter is at least a living symbol. 
The General Assembly cannot reflect the various wants of the 
world community or voice its aspirations without authentic spokes-
men fQr a~l the Chinese people. Parliamentary diplomacy cannot 
be practiced there with the best prospects of full effectiveness 
without the presence of their representatives. Moreover such an 
entity as the Peoples Republic of China should be clearly sub-
jected to the. obligations stat~d in the Charter. This requires its 
representation in the United Nations. 
The case for the second solution has been forcefully stated by 
a private propagandist association, styled the American Security 
Council, in · a special issue of its "Washington Report," June 1961. 
This organization was strongly of the opinion that the record of 
the Peking Government in its relations with its neighbors as well 
as with the United Nations did not support the claim that it was 
the government of a "peace-loving" state. The objections to the 
admission of Communist China's representatives into the United 
Nations were summarized in the following four theses: (1) c'The 
U nited States's strategic position in the Far East ... would be ir-
reparably damaged." (2) ccThe United States's moral position as 
leader of essential Free-World alliances would be destroyed." 
(3) The United States should not support the two-China con-
cept. (4) The United Nations would be rendered c'completely 
ineffective." 
The case against the seating of representatives of Communist 
China in the United Nations was widely accepted in the United 
States, where the participation of Communist forces in the military 
operations in Korea had made an unpopular war much more dif-
ficult for the American people. Though fifteen other Member States 
furnished contingents wp.ich fought alongside the American forces, 
the main burden of the fighting in Korea fell upon South Korea 
and the United States. The idea of Communist Chinese participa-
tion in a general international organization, whose authority they 
had been resisting on the Korean battle-fields, was highly repug-
nant. There was even talk of American withdrawal from the United 
Nations, if representatives of the Peking Government were admit-
ted to its deliberations. Such talk gave the case against the Peking 
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Government greater influence in the United Nations than it might 
otherwise have had. 
The case for an autonomous Taiwan, which should have sepa-
rate representation in the United Nations in addition to the repre-
sentatives of the Peking Government, has received less considera-
tion than the others. Though sometimes called the C'two-Chinas" 
plan, this is an obvious misnomer. Both the Peking and the Taiwan 
Government regard Taiwan as a Chinese province and reject all 
suggestions that it become an independent state. The Government 
of the United States declared its intention to return the island to 
China in the Cairo Declaration of 1943, but the peace treaty with 
Japan did not explicitly accomplish this result. In recent years the 
American government has steadily insisted that the Government 
·on Taiwan is in law, if not in fact, the Government of China. 
But conditions on the island are very different from those on the 
mainland. Japanese capital and enterprise during the Japanese 
occupation caused more rapid development of island industry 
than that in mainland China. American capital and enterprise in 
recent years have continued the development of the island until ' 
Taiwan has reached a more advanced stage of economic develop-
ment than any country in Asia except Japan. The people of Taiwan, 
though of Chinese extraction, may not want a close connection 
with those on the mainland. The relationship between the two, if 
both were members of the United Nations, would have a better 
chance of being determined, not by force, but by pacific settlement. 
In the Sixteenth General Assembly the problem of China was 
discussed at length for the first time. On Dec. 15, 1961, the discus-
sion ended in a vote on a resolution introduced by the Soviet Union, 
calling for the seating of representatives of the Peking Government 
in place of those from Taiwan. This resolution naturally caused 
the advocates of all other solutions of the Chinese problem to com-
bine against the advocates of the first solution. It is not surprising 
that the Soviet U nion~ s resolution was defeated. The actual vote 
was 37 in favor, 48 against, and 19 abstaininng. 
This result was not much more encouraging for the supporters 
of the second solution under American leadership than for the 
supporters of the first under Russian leadership. Neither side polled 
a majority of the total membership of the United Nations. Sixteen 
of the non-aligned and uncommitted Member States and three of 
the United States~ military allies, obviously preferring some other 
solution, held the balance of power between the Russian and 
American groups. Four of the United States' military allies, signin-
cantly headed by the United Kingdom, supported the Russian 
resolution. The Soviet bloc of course voted solidly for its own reso-
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lution. Of the other votes for the resolution twenty came from 
members of the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned States and 
three from the other uncommitted Member States. It was evident 
that some acceptable form of the so-called "two Chinas" solution 
would have to be found. 
3. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recom-
mends the recognition of an autonomous Taiwan, entitled to its 
own representatives in the General Assembly, in addition to the 
representatives of the Peking Government regarded as· the effective 
government of China. There is an excellent opportunity here for 
an imaginative act of creative statesmanship. The two parts of the 
Chinese people, protesting that they are all one people, should be 
more capable of settling their differences by peaceful negotiation 
within the frame-work of the United Nations. Before the employ-
ment of more drastic measures that opportunity should be pro-
vided for them. 
v. K.orea and Vietnam 
The other 'divided states, Korea and Vietnam, present two 
problems, resembling in some ways but not in all the problems of 
Germany and China. Each of these states possesses an ancient his-
tory and venerable cultural traditions. Both have been tributaries 
of the Chinese Empire. Confucian Temples in die capitals and 
monuments in the villages to the success of local scholars at the 
triennial civil service examinations attest the long domination of 
classical Chinese, political ideas and the wide diffusion of classical 
Chinese political institutions. Korea was wrenched loose from the 
Chinese political system by the Japanese near the end of the nine-
teenth century; Vietnam, by the French only a few years earlier. 
Both Korea and Vietnam mixed their classical Chinese politics 
with the Buddhist religion originally derived from India, forming 
a solid base for resistance to the dogmatic Marxism-Leninism de-
rived from the Soviet Union. Yet in recent years conditions in both 
made for a hospitable reception to new ideas of political and eco-
nomic freedom streaming in from the West. Modern nationalism 
and anti-colonialism combined to make two proud peoples in-
tensely desirous of possessing the advantages of both Western 
scientific and technical progress and a government of their own 
conducted by their own leaders and primarily for their own ben-
efit. Each country boasted a population of twice the size of most 
United Nations Member States. In each intelligent young men with 
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modern educations looked forward to a respectable position for 
their state and people in the contemporary family of nations. 
Both countries were divided by accident rather than design. In 
Korea the Soviet Union accepted the surrender of the Japanese 
forces in the northern region and the United States accepted it in 
the south. Each of these two Powers naturally wished to guide the 
further development of the country, thus casually falling under 
their control, according to its own sense of what was necessary and 
proper. The Russians wished to establish a Communist regime; the 
Americans, an example of the free-enterprise system. The Amer-
icans urged that the Koreans, of whom the South Koreans under 
United States influence formed a large majority, should be permit-
ted to determine their own national character by a United Nations 
plebiscite. Thus the problem of Korea resembled that of Germany. 
The Russians stubbornly resisted the incorporation of their part 
into the whole; the Americans stoutly contended for the integrity 
of Korea. 
In Vietnam conditions led to the contrary result. The Japanese 
had ousted the French from the country during the war, and 
modem-minded Vietnamese resisted their return. The regime 
which the French sought to establish was least acceptable to 
Vietnamese with political and economic ideas made in Moscow 
and leadership of the nationalist and anti-colonialist cause fell into 
their hands. Their greatest strength lay in the northern part of the 
country, where support from bey'ond the border was most readily 
available. When the French decided to abandon their claim to the 
country, possession of the North was surrendered to the resistance 
forces under Ho Chi Minh, and a regime more agreeable to French 
influence was installed in the south. 
The settlement reached at Geneva in 1954 provided for the 
division of French Indo-China into three parts. Two of the parts, 
Cambodia and Laos, were declared independent states and admit-
ted to the United Nations the following year. Vietnam, however, 
was divided between two separate governments, one operating in 
the north and the other in the south, and could not be admitted 
immediately. The state was to be unified later after a plebiscite to 
ascertain the choice of the people between the two regimes. But 
the population of the North exceeded that of the South, and the 
government of the Southern regime opposed such a solution. 
The United States also, though inconsistent with its position on 
Korea and Germany, opposed reunification by plebiscite. Thus the 
problem of Vietnam resembled that of China. Should there not 
be, therefore, since the conditions are similar, some kind of "two 
Vietnams" solution? 
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4. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recom-
mends that the Korean and Vietnamese problems be referred to 
the United Nations. Every effort should be made to arrange at the 
earliest practicable time a general settlement of the problems of 
Korea and Vietnam. Our Commission recognizes that Korean and 
Vietnamese unification is not likely to be realized in the near 
future, but it is convinced that the time has come for the United 
Nations to take a more active part in the search for a solution. 
The services of the Secretary-General and his principal aides, who 
constitute the world's most valuable agency for promoting peaceful 
change in international relationships, would be more available for 
encouraging and assisting negotiations to that end. If successful, 
such negotiations would be an important step toward universal 
membership. This would make a substantial contribution toward 
achieving the purposes of the Organization. 
VI. Liberated Colonies 
The problem of the new states to be created from the dependent 
territories of obsolete colonial empires in process of liquidation is 
an extension of the problem already presented ·by the recent ad-
mission to the United Nations of numerous former colonial depend-
encies with little or no previous experience of self-government as 
practiced either in the modern West or in the classical Far East. 
In some of these new states periods of tutelage under the mandates 
system of the League of Nations or the trusteeship system of the 
United Nations, or both, have supplied limited training in modem 
processes of government. In others, notably in the former British 
and French colonies, fruitful opportunities for political education 
abroad were extended to the more promising aspirants for leader-
ship among the indigenous peoples. In still others, notably in the 
Belgian Congo, educational opportunities had been restricted to 
persons in clerical or industrial occupations with little regard for 
the needs of future political development. In the colonies of coun-
tries ruled by military dictatorships, notably Portugal and Spain, 
there was even less concern for the political education of the in-
digenous populations than for that of the subject peoples at home. 
From such sources, beginning in 1945 with the Philippines and 
pausing at the end of 1961 with Tanganyika, more than forty 
newly independent states have been admitted to the United Na-
tions. A majority of th~se new Member States have been carved 
out of former colonial areas in tropical Africa. Indeed nearly all 
the new Member States admitted to the United Nations in recent 
years are of tropical African origin. With the addition of these 
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former colonial dependencies the Member States in Africa and 
Asia compose a majority of the total membership of the United 
Nations. The political complexion of the United Nations has been 
radically changed. 
The original leaders of the movement to establish a general 
international organization for the purpose of keeping the peace, 
and helping to create conditions around the world under which 
peace-keeping might be most likely to succeed, were states in the 
West where modern industry was highly developed and capital 
available for export was abundant. In the nature of things the most 
influential members of the League of Nations were highly indus-
trialized. The leadership of the United Nations in its early years 
was similar. The experience of the period between the two 'world 
wars was needed to cause the United States to take its proper part 
in the establishment of the latter organization. But the responsible 
leadership of both organizations was vested in nations with ad-
vanced technology and highly developed productive capa~ity. 
Now the underdeveloped nations possess a majority of the votes 
in the UN General Assembly. Leadership in that body must be 
responsive to the needs of emergent nations whose wants exceed 
their productive capacity to satisfy. The difficult task of creating 
conditions around the world under which peace-keeping may be 
most likely to succeed cannot be managed by the well-developed 
nations alone. They must take account of the wishes of peoples 
who could be ignored in the "good old days" before the liquidation 
of the West European empires had begun. This new nuclear and 
electronic age is indeed an age that is radically different from what 
we used to call modern times. 
It is not surprising that some Americans, including even a few 
who cherished hign hopes for the United Nations in its early years, 
should have become distrustful of the Organization in its present 
form. They question the qualifications of newly independent states 
with so little modem education and industrial capacity for an equal 
position in the management of a general international organization 
with an important role in world politics. May not these new 
Member States act irresponsibly in the exercise of their unfamiliar 
powers? Will they not fall under the influence of the Soviet Union 
and turn the United Nations against its original leaders? Has not 
the United States already lost control of the Organization and does 
it not jeopardize its own security by relying overmuch on this un-
proven international machinery for producing a rule of law under 
the Charter? 
Such fears are magnified by the prospect of the further growth 
of the Organization through the admission to membership of 
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additional new states from the continued liquidation of obsolete 
colonial empires. The expected additional states will on the whole 
compare unfavorably with those already admitted. The inhabit-
ants of the Portuguese and Spanish possessions in tropical Africa 
are even less prepared for independence than those of the Belgian 
Congo. The remaining British, Dutch, and French dependencies 
are mostly smaller than those already liberated; they are more 
widely scattered; many of them are insular possessions with in-
adequate resources for maintaining the character of a sovereign 
state in the modern world. Are they all presently to have an 
equal voice in the UN General Assembly? 
Uncertainty concerning the lengths to which anti-colonialism 
will be carried by the African and Asian Member States in the 
United Nations increases the existing reluctance to make member-
ship in the Organization universal. A delegate to the General 
Assembly from Sierra Leone may concede that one from St. Helena, 
if and when that isolated island is admitted to membership, should 
not have an equal voice with himself, but will the delegate from 
St. Helena prove equally reasonable? The percentage of the world's 
population still living in colonial dependencies is small-appar-
ently less than two per cent of the total-but its destiny is obscure. 
It is difficult even to estimate the number of additional Member 
States that would be brought into the United Nations family by 
the complete triumph of modem anti-colonialism. It is clear, how-
ever, that in the remaining colonial empires there are many poten-
tial candidates for admission. 
It is easy to exaggerate the difficulties for the United Nations 
that may arise from the complete liquidation of the obsolete colo-
nial empires. The case of Western Samoa may have unexpected 
significance. This former German possession, which had been 
under the tutelage of New Zealand first through a League of 
Nations mandate and then as a United Nations trusteed territory, 
gained its independence at the beginning of 1962. Instead of apply-
ing for immediate admission to the United Nations, however, it 
announced that it would be content for the near future with self-
government without active participation in world politics. What 
this may mean as a precedent does not yet appear, but it is clear 
that there is wide room for experimentation in the development 
of new relatioI).ships between the United Nations and the liberated 
colonial dependencies. 
It must be admitted that the liquidation of the colonial empires 
has created new problems for the United Nations. Many of the 
newly liberated states are comparatively small, as well as under-
developed and lacking in political experience. Their boundaries 
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problems. There is much to be done, as the Commission to Study 
the Organization of Peace has shown in previous reports, to 
strengthen the United Nations and develop its capacity to achieve 
its objectives. One of these necessary tasks, we believe, is to bring 
into the Organization all independent states capable of fulfilling 
the obligations of membership. The purposes of the United Na-
tions, we are convinced, cannot be fully accomplished until it 
becomes a universal organization. 
5. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recom-
mends, therefore, that new independent states, resulting from the 
continued liquidation of colonial empires, be promptly admitted 
to the United Nations, if capable of fulfilling their responsibilities 
under the Charter. The Commission sees no need for further tests 
of such capacity beyond what have been applied in connection 
with recent admissions. States whose governments doubt their 
readiness to meet the expenses of membership in the United 
Nations and of maintaining permanent delegations at the head-
quarters in New York may, like Western Samoa, prefer a less 
formal relationship to the Organization. In some cases an answer 
to this problem may be found in the formation of federations, as 
the British colonies in the West Indies have been trying to do. 
There is wide room for imaginative experimentation in this field 
of political engineering. 
What is most urgently needed is a suitable successor to the 
Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Information from 
Non-Self-Governing Territories. It should command the services 
of technical experts able to assist small states in the development 
of federations, where conditions are favorable, and in the main-
tenance of a viable independent existence, where federalization 
is impracticable. It is difficult to define the minimum size of a state 
to be admitted to the United Nations, but the line should be drawn 
to exclude very small states. Lichtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino 
show how even the smallest independent states can find for them-
selves a satisfactory place in the United Nations family through 
membership in Specialized Agencies without formally joining the 
Organization or sitting in the General Assembly. Newly liberated 
and politically inexperienced states, though more populous and 
productive than any of these three, may well need further assist-
ance before assuming all the obligations of a regular member state. 
The Organization should be in a position to supply such assistance, 
particularly if the new small state falls also in the category of 
underdeveloped. The new council or committee would not only 
protect and assist these smaller states but also represent their 
interests before agencies of the United Nations. 
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6. The Commission recommends further, therefore, ' that the 
United Nations encourage the formation of federations under the 
appropriate circumstances by newly liberated peoples desiring 
admission to membership. The Organization has already shown 
itself hospitable to the formation of federations by Member States 
in the case of the United Arab Republic. This attitude should be 
maintained. and· technical aid and other assistance might well be 
extended to states bent on experimenting with projects of federal-
ization. The formation of larger political units is a natural phe-
nomenon in this nuclear and electronic age. There is abundant 
opportunity in the United Nations, as presently organized, for the 
further appplication of the principle of federalism. 
7. The Commission also recommends the development of more. 
informal relationships between the Organization and autonomous 
areas or independent states of limited resources springing· from the 
continued liquidation of colonial empires. For many of the small 
dependencies the important end result should be self-government, 
and not necessarily active participation in world politics. The pos-
sibility of peaceful changes in international relationships is a great-
er attraction to these states than that of participation in organized 
arrangements for collective coercion of states contemptuous of 
their obligations under the Charter. The impressive achievements 
of the United Nations in recent years in promoting peaceful settle-
ments in various threatening situations suggest the desirability of 
devising suitable relationships with independent states primarily 
interested in the development of this most promising function of 
parliamentary diplomacy and of the Secretary-General. The failure 
in the case of the Portuguese colonies in India, where international 
law seemed to favor one side and natural equity the other, empha-
sizes the importance of pushing this development as rapidly as 
possible. There is much that should and c~n be done to make the 
dissolution of the obsolete colonial empires a source of additional 
strength and not merely of additional problems for the United 
Nations. 
VII. UlJited States Policy 
Despite the great strength of the general case for universal 
membership in the United Nations there is opposition to the ad-
mission of certain types of states. In recent years the critics of 
universality have directed their objections particularly against the 
admissibility of increasing numbers of small, weak, and politically 
inexperienced states springing from the liquidation of the colonial 
empires. They complain of the unwillingness of many of these 
states to share equitably the expenses and other obligations of the 
United Nations, while insisting on a full and equal voice in the 
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making of decisions, the burdens of which must be assumed by 
others. They think they see a growing ~~double standard" of inter-
national morality, reflected in a disposition to condone resort to 
military force in violation of the Charter by Member States with 
whose objectives they sympathize, while applying stricter tests to 
other Member States. They deplore an allegedly growing tendency 
to bloc voting which puts the interests of special groups of states 
ahead of the general interests of the world community. They de-
nounce an allegedly expanding tendency to interfere in the internal 
affairs of other Member States. They conclude that the admission 
of these states tends to throw the balance of power in the United 
Nations too much in favor of the Soviet Union. . 
American critics stress particularly the effect of these new ad-
missions on the leadership of the United States in world politics. 
They assert that the American Government has lost control of the 
world organization. They predict that control cannot be regained, 
if these politically inexperienced Member States continue to in-
crease in number. They conclude that the United States should put 
its faith more largely in its military alliances. They urge the de-
velopment of NATO or some better agent of the Western Powers 
into a more effective instrument of the "free world." 
A partial answer to this point of view is to raise the question: 
What are the national interests of the United States in regard to 
the United Nations? Is it in the national interest to consider the 
United Nations (1) an instrument of United States policy, (2) an 
instrument for promoting the diffusion of free democratic institu-
tions throughout the world, (3) a reflection of world opinion as 
it really is, or ( 4) an instrument for the realization of the purposes 
and principles expressed in the Charter? 
To the first question the answer is unmistakable. In the early 
years of the Organization it was natural that the United States, 
with the prestige of victory in World War II and overwhelming 
power by reason of its monopoly of the atomic bomb, should have 
treated the United Nations as an instrument of its own national 
policies. It is clear, however, that under the changed conditions in 
this rapidly changing world, if this attitude continues, the United 
States cannot hold the leadership in the United Nations. 
Secondly, it is equally clear that the ideal of free democracy, as 
understood in the United States, will not dominate among the 
membership of the United Nations in the presently foreseeable 
future. This ideal is very imperfectly manifested even among the 
present military allies of the United States, which include several 
non-democratic and some actively anti-democratic states. Among 
the non-aligned and uncommitted states only a few are in any 
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proper sense of the term free democracies. The Communist states 
look toward a "democratization" of their institutions along the lines 
indicated in the party program, adopted at the Twenty-Second 
Party Congress in October, 1961, but they believe that "the dicta-
torship of the proletariat" must continue, until the people are suf-
ficiently educated in Marxism-Leninism to support voluntarily the 
Communist system. Under these circumstances the United States 
cannot maintain leadership in the United Nations merely bypropa-
gandist slogans or preachments of free democracy and the virtue 
of free elections. 
There has been influential support for an affirmative answer to 
the third question. John Foster Dulles wrote, before he became 
Secretary of State, that he had "come to believe that the United 
Nations will best serve the cause of peace, if its Assembly is repre-
sentative of what the world actually is, and not merely representa-
tive of the parts that we like. Therefore, we ought to be willing 
that all the nations should be members without attempting to 
appraise closely those which are 'good' and those which are 'bad.' 
Already that distinction is obliterated by the present membership 
of the United Nations. Some of the present member nations, and 
others that might become members, have governments that are not 
representative of the people. But if in fact they are 'governments,' 
-that is, if they 'govern,'-then they have a power which should 
"be represented in any organization that purports to m,irror world 
reality." (See Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 
Ninth Report, p. 23.) 
At that time Mr. Dulles thought that Mainland China should be 
represented and, though he modified this opinion after he became 
Secretary of State, he continued to favor "approximate universal-
ity" of the United Nations. His conception, however, seemed to 
consider the United Nations as a passive index of opinion rather 
than an active force in the world. The United States undoubtedly 
has a national interest in knowing what world opinion really is 
and in supporting institutions which will contribute to this knowl-
edge. The dangers which arise from a lack of such knowledge were 
indicated by recent mistakes of policy in the Cuban and Laotian 
situations. These situations also indicate, however, that United Na-
tions debate may not be adequate to reHect opinion even among 
the members, though doubtless it helps. In any case the United 
States has a broader interest in the United Nations than that it 
shall serve merely as a mirror of world opinion. " 
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace believes 
that the United States has a major national interest in developing 
the United Nations as an active force to establish conditions in the 
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world under which peace, justice and respect for international 
obligations can be maintained. The experience of the last seventeen 
years, as well as earlier history, indicates that a free constitutional 
democracy, like the United States, is at a disadvantage in an 
anarchic world of states vulnerable to immediate attack and en-
gaged in an arms race. Under such conditions democracies feel 
impelled to militarize and to some extent abandon free democracy 
in order to keep up in the competition, or fall behind and succumb 
either to superior force or to gradual attrition. The Commission 
believes that the conditions under which democracy can in the 
long run survive can be maintained only by realizing the purposes 
and principles set forth in the United Nations Charter. 
A major national interest of the United States, therefore, is that 
the United Nations achieve its purposes and maintain its principles. 
This is also a major interest of a large majority of the members of 
the United Nations. The non-aligned and uncommitted states are 
not primarily interested in the rivalry between Communism and 
Western Democracy. They see merits and defects in each system. 
They are interested in the elimination of war and threats of war, 
in respect for their territorial integrity and national independ-
ence, in the self-determination of peoples seeking independence, 
in respect for human rights irrespective of race, color, language, or 
religion, and especially in economic and social progress for under-
developed peoples. 
Policies clearly and sincerely forwarding these purposes and 
principles will command a majority in the United Nations. By 
taking care that its policies are of that character the United States 
can maintain leadership in the United Nations now and even more 
when the United Nations becomes universal and more capable of 
maintaining its principles. Furthermore, leadership of this kind, 
supported by the uncommitted states, would not only strengthen 
the United Nations in world opinion, but would establish its im-
partiality in cold-war controversies and give it greater competence 
than it now possesses to mediate or conciliate major controversies. 
It is clearly in the national interest of the United States under 
present conditions that the United Nations should occupy the posi-
tion of an impartial mediator. With a universal membership and 
an a ppropria te American policy this seems possible of achievement. 
A further answer to the opponents of a universal United Nations 
is afforded by a look at the record of actual voting in the General 
Assembly. In the Sixteenth General Assembly, during which the 
number of Member States rose from 99 to 104, there were three 
outstanding roll calls, on which the attitudes of the United States 
and the Soviet Union were in direct conBict and the division 
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of opinion among the newer and less experienced members was 
clearly reveared. The first of these, which took place on December 
15, 1961, recorded the votes cast on a Russian resolution to solve 
the China problem by seating representatives of the Peking Gov-
ernment in place of those from Taiwan. The second too~ place on 
December 20 on a resolution, urgently supported by the United 
States, proposing to meet the rapidly accumulating fiscal deficit 
caused by the operations in the Congo by a bond issue of $200,-
000,000. The third, recorded on January 30, 1962, was occasioned 
by another resolution strongly supported by the Soviet Union, 
dealing in drastic fashion with the problem of Angola. 
Since it is the record of the newly admitted, weak, and politically 
inexperienced Member States that is of primary interest in an 
analysis of the voting in the Sixteenth General Assembly, the analy-
sis begins by putting these states in their proper places among the 
other members. For this purpose the whole group of under-
developed states requires investigation. In the light of the latest 
statistics collected by the United Nations, especially those pub-
lished by the Managing Director of the United Nations Special 
Fund, Paul G. Hoffman, the underdeveloped states may be con-
veniently described as those with a gross national product below 
three hundred dollars a year per capita. There were altogether 
seventy-one of these Member States at the beginning of 1962. De-
spite important practical differences between conditions in states 
with less than one hundred dollars gross national product per 
capita and in others with a per capita production three times as 
high, there can be no doubt that all are underdeveloped by com-
parison with the Member States in which modern industrial tech-
nology and capital a,?cumulation are most advanced. 
The more advanced states, technologically speaking, differ 
greatly among themselves. There are only sixteen Member States 
which, on account of the high development of their vital industries, 
especially the armaments industry, or the advanced state of de-
velopment of their productive capacity generally, can be put in 
the highest class. Among them the United States and the Soviet 
Union are outstanding, though for different reasons. There are 
seventeen Member States in various intermediate stages of de-
velopment between the most advanced and those definitely classed 
as underdeveloped. They range from Japan, with its advanced in-
dustry and its traditional agriculture, at one end to states like Cuba 
and Venezuela, where large outside capitalistic investments have 
stimulated a more rapid development of the national productive 
capacity than could be effectively controlled by the traditional 
economic and political institutions. (See Appendix B.) 
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In the Sixteenth General Assembly, for the first time, the , 
underdeveloped nations, many of which had been admitted to 
membership in the last five years, possessed two-thirds of the total 
number of votes. They were in a position to control the action of 
the General Assembly, if disposed to act together. Neither the 
Communist bloc, nor the military alliances organized by the United 
States, could control the Assembly without the support of at least 
a majority of these underdeveloped and in many cases politically 
inexperienced Member States. Most of these states professed to 
be uncommitted in the struggle between the two super-powers or 
at least not to be formally aligned with either of them. It was 
evident that their voting behavior would not only be important for 
the present effectiveness of the United Nations but also significant 
for its future success with the further addition of small, weak, and 
politically inexperienced states growing out of the continued liqui-
dation of obsolete colonial empires. 
The pattern of voting behavior in the most advanced group of 
states is impressively irregular. In the first test roll-call, the United 
Kingdom and the Scandinavian states rejected the leadership of 
the United States and voted with the Soviet Union for seating the 
Peking representatives in place of the Taiwan representatives of 
China. In the second test roll-call France and Belgium joined with 
the Soviet Union in resisting the two hu'ndred million dollar bond 
issue. In the third test roll-call alone did all the non-communist 
states in advanced stages of industrial development vote in the 
same way as the United States. It is evident that those industrially 
advanced states, which hold privileged positions of potential 
leadership by virtue of their permanent seats in the Security Coun-
cil, are disinclined to respect any leadership but their own. 
In the intermediate class of states the pattern becomes less 
confused. The leadership of the Soviet Union was followed with-
out deviation by all the Communist states. The leadership of the 
United States was followed by the non-Communist states with 
considerably more regularity than in the first class. Half of all the 
states in this class supported the position of the United States on 
the first test vote, two-thirds supported it on the second, and a 
majority on the third. The general picture was clearly more favor-
able to American than to Russian leadership. 
In the third class of underdeveloped states a different pattern 
of voting emerges. The solidarity of the Communist bloc is fully 
maintained, affording an example of rigid political discipline ill-
designed to attract newly liberated colonial dependencies jealous 
of their new found freedom and reluctant to risk it by too close 
association with any leading power. There is no similar solidarity 
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in any of the groups of underdeveloped states more or less closely 
associated with one or another of the Western leaders. The out-
standing feature of the pattern is the strong tendency of the newer 
underdeveloped Member States to keep out of the conflicts be-
tween the nuclear giants. The tropical African states are the most 
prone to avoid involvement in these conflicts by recording them-
selves on the roll-calls as present, but not voting, or by staying 
away from a roll-call altogether. 
These voting patterns confirm the results of a similar analysis of 
leading roll-calls in the Fifteenth General Assembly. (See Commis-
sion to Study the Organization of P~ace, Fourteenth Report, pub-
lished by the Commission, 1962, pp. _. 9-12.) The Commission to 
Study the Organization of Peace found at that time that the record 
"should -be encouraging to perceptive Americans." "The position 
of the Soviet bloc," it reported, "was considerably weaker than that 
of the American-formed group of states." Moreover, "the so-called 
Neutralists and other non-aligned and uncommitted nations were 
conspicuous for their lack of solidarity .... " The Commission con-
cluded that "the fears of those who question the qualifications of 
newly liberated and politically inexperienced peoples for active 
participation in United Nations politics do not seem warranted by 
the recent experience of the Organization." 
These conclusions are strengthened by the voting on the test 
roll-calls in the Sixteenth General Assembly. The delegations from 
south of the Sahara continue to support the authority of the 
Secretary-General, when challenged by a major power with special 
interests in view, and to avoid embroilment in the conflicts be-
tween the super-powers growing out of the manoeuvres of rival 
aspirants for leadership. The unanimous election of U Thant to 
fill the remainder of Dag Hammarskjold's term of office was an 
impressive triumph for the forces within the United Nations which 
are striving to build the kind of world order described in Articles 
1 and 2 of the Charter. The unanimous choice of this firm and 
politic diplomat from southeast Asia for this major world office 
should greatly encourage all peace-loving peoples who believe in 
the kind of peace-keeping represented by the developing opera-
tions of the UN Organization. The restrained reliance on military 
force and growing emphasis on the pacific settlement of interna-
tional disputes through the mediatory and conciliatory offices of 
the Organization describe the most probable course of its further 
development under the impact of the changing conditions iIi world 
politics. 
The final answer to the opponents of a universal United Nations 
will be a well-planned program for the further development of the 
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underdeveloped nations in all parts of the world. The great success 
of the Marshall Plan naturally promoted interest in other plans for 
improving economic conditions in depressed areas in other parts 
of the world, by financing projects for increasing national produc-
tivity. As Western Europe returned to normality after World War 
II leaders of the "free world" began to explore the possibilities of 
strengthening the resistance to Soviet Communism by economic 
aid to the underdeveloped countries. Under the Truman Adminis-
tration the point-four program of technical assistance made a 
promising beginning witl~ the cooperation of the UN Specialized 
Agencies. Under the Eisenhower Administration the new policy 
was carried further with the establishment of the UN Special Fund. 
But both the superpowers, sustained by great expectations of favor-
able effects on the national fortunes in the Cold War, preferred to 
put their trust chiefly in unilateral arrangements for economic aid. 
Participation in operations under the United Nations received 
secondary support from the Government of the United States and 
less than that from the Government of the Soviet Union. 
There were, of course, important differences between the 
conditions with which the Marshall Plan was designed to deal and 
those in the Asian and African countries for which the unilateral 
American and Russian programs of economic aid and technical 
assistance were designed. The basic problem was not that of re-
storing a shattered economy in a nation temporarily exhausted by 
ruinous war; but one of developing fresh productive capability in 
nations with governments lacking experience, and in many cases 
also interest, in the marvels of modern science and technology. 
It was a problem involving not only the supply of indispensable 
technical aid and economic assistance but also the design of safe-
guards to prevent dependence on foreign aid from turning into a 
new form of colonialism incompatible with a genuine independ-
ence. These differences were most significant in the case of the 
newly liberated colonial dependencies, especially those in tropical 
Mrica. Would it be possible for both the super-powers and the 
new states to get what they wanted under these conditions? 
The problem of rapid development in the underdeveloped states 
was more complex in other ways than in the more advanced . 
states for which the Marshall Plan was devised. It was not simply 
a matter _of extending credit on an unprecedented scale to govern-
ments capaole of executing their own plans for relief, recovery, 
and rehabilitation, if supplied with the necessary means. Fresh 
capital on credit alone would not be enough. Satisfactory economic 
development would require also measures for the stabilization of 
prices in the world market for nations engaged mainly in the pro-
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duction of foodstuffs and raw materials. It would require technical 
assistance not only in mastering the new techniques of modern 
industry but also in improving ancient forms of agriculture. There 
would be great need of progressive developments in the general 
field of public education. There would be even the stubborn ques-
tion of balancing the expected reduction in death-rates with new 
forms of control over traditionally high birth-rates. 
Moreover, experience soon showed that economic aid and 
technical assistance, even when most effective in attaining imme-
diate objectives, may not guarantee satisfactory relations between 
the sponsors of aid programs and their beneficiaries. For instance, 
the stabilization of sugar prices and the guarantee of a rich foreign 
market by the Government of the United States brought Cuba to 
a more advanced stage of economic development than most of the 
tropical Latin American states enjoyed, but it did not produce a 
Cuban Government capable of managing the economy satisfac-
torily. Some new political invention is required, which will enable 
the United Nations to furnish acceptable guidance to newly in-
dependent nations whose economic development threatens to 
outrun the development of their political capacity. This is a prob-
lem for solution by the United Nations, not by superpowers with 
unilateral projects prompted by a primary concern for their own 
special interests. 
The experience of the United Nations Operation in the Congo 
is an impressive harbinger of a new era in the development of the 
United Nations. The Organization has again demonstrated its 
ability to recruit an efficient peace force at short notice. To-
gether with the Specialized Agencies, it has demonstrated also 
the ability to command diversified and extensive human resources 
for technical assistance. Though the coordination of these resources 
has left something to be desired, the performance is apparently 
proving equal to the most urgent need. The struggle to meet the 
challenge of the emergency has strengthened more than it has 
strained the Organization. 
The greatest difficulty has been presented by the problem of 
financing this abnormally expensive operation. The total cost of 
the Congo activities is but a minute fraction of the direct cost of 
the arms race during the same period, yet ordinary revenues of 
the Organization have been permitted to fall far short of covering 
the charges. There has been a strange reluctance to employ deficit 
financing for this operation. American experience in the early 
years of the Federal Union showed that the bold creation of public 
debts for important public purposes could bring powerful support 
to a struggling new organization. There should be a ready market 
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among the more advanced industrialized Member States for neces-
sary loans for expensive peace-keeping activities in an emergency. 
There is also need for expanded use of the public credit in the 
further economic development of underdeveloped Member States. 
The experienced management of the Special Fund under the 
leadership of its Managing Director, Paul G. HoHman, has already 
made good use of sound techniques for preparing such programs. 
What is most needed at this stage in the evolution of the United 
Nations is to put greater eHorts into the development of this part 
of the Organization's work. The colonial system should be sup-
planted by something better than the Trusteeship System, which 
seems to be fulfilling its mission more rapidly than could have 
been anticipated seventeen years ago. Settled arrangements 
should be made for planning and financing extensive improve-
ments in the underdeveloped Member States which will make 
membership in the United Nations a manifest advance over the 
status of dependencies under the old colonial system. 
8. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recom-
mends, therefore, that the public credit be employed on a large 
scale to enable the United Nations Organization and Specialized 
Agencies to execute carefully prepared programs of internal im-
provements in underdeveloped Member States. 
There should be a fairer balance between the highly industrial-
ized Member States and the underdeveloped Member States than 
now exists in the raising and appropriation of money by the Gen-
eral Assembly under the Charter. (See discussion in our Thirteenth 
Report, pp. 41 and 42). But satisfactory fiscal practices are already 
established for such agencies as the International Bank and the 
International Development Association. The capital funds at the 
disposal of these Agencies, especially the latter, should be greatly 
enlarged and their operations rapidly expanded in states which 
indicate willingness to cooperate and provide an appropriate 
fiscal, governmental and social climate. 
9. The Commission recommends also that improved arrange-
ments be designed for coordinating the programs of technical 
assistance administered by the U nited Nations Secretariat and the 
Specialized Agencies. The wide latitude allowed to the Special-
ized Agencies in the management of their activities was useful 
during the experimental stage of their operations. Imaginative 
thinking needed encouragement, while these Agencies were 
demonstrating their practical usefulness. Now the need is for the 
greatest possible operating efficiency, while their potential services 
are seriously limited by insufficient financial resources. Admission 
of numerous newly liberated colonial dependencies into the 
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United Nations involves the Organization in new responsibilities 
and requires that it must be better organized in order to meet 
them effectively. 
10. Finally, the Commission recommends that United States 
policy in the United Nations be based on the support of the Mem-
ber States most strongly committed to the Purposes and Principles 
of the United Nations, set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter. 
The Government of the United States, as a leading aspirant to 
United Nations leadership, should rely more than heretofore on 
the spontaneous collaboration of the Member States which believe 
most strongly in the Organization>s capacity to achieve its objec-
tives. There is little likelihood that either military allies, or Mem-
ber States which are democracies in the Western sense of the term 
and hence more likely than others to be sympathetic political 
associates, will form a majority of the membership of the United 
Nations in the foreseeable future. A large majority of the Member 
States, however, including most of the Western-type democracies 
and many others, are strongly committed to United Nations pur-
poses and principles. They form a group, leadership of which by 
the United States should be a point of departure for the further 
development of American policy in world politics. 
VUI. A New View 0/ an Old American Goal 
Despite the great strength of the general case for a universal 
United Nations there is continued opposition in various quarters 
to the further strengthening and development of the Organization. 
The clue to this opposition was clearly exposed by President 
Kennedy in his Address to the Congress on the State of the Union, 
January 11, 1962. "But arms alone are not enough to keep the 
peace,n he declared; "it must be kept by men.n Then he stated his 
main point with impressive clarity and force. "Our instrurrnent and 
our hope is the United Nations, and I see little merit in the im-
patience of those who would abandon this imperfect world instru-
ment because they dislike our imperfect world. For the troubles 
of a world organization merely reflect the troubles of the world 
itseH.n 
Outstanding among those who dislike our imperfect world are 
the Marxist-Leninists. Their attitude toward the organization of 
peace found most recent and authentic expression in the official 
program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted at 
the Twenty-Second Party Congress, October, 1961, in Moscow. 
This program forms a lengthy and exhaustive document, which 
has a great deal to say about the "world Socialist system» and the 
strong desire of the Communist Party leaders to pursue a policy 
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of "peaceful coexistence" to the end that this world system may be 
rapidly developed and strengthened. But the program is strangely 
vague concerning the details of its structure and processes. c'The 
world Socialist system is a new type of economic and political 
relationship between countries," the program asserts,-a cCsocio-
economic and political community of ·purpose." But how will this 
cCcommunity" be organized? The program does not plainly say. 
In fact the Soviet design of a world state leaves a great deal to 
the imagination. Karl Marx's original idea seemed to be that a 
dictatorship of the international proletariat would eventually put 
an end to the need for organized political institutions and the state 
would c'wither away". Under Lenin's more aggressive and vigorous 
leadership of the international Communist movement the end of 
the need for political institutions faded from view and the idea 
that the state would wither away itself withered away. In its place 
there has developed the idea of the Soviet world. state, "the most 
extravagantly coercive, caste-ridden world state ever conceived in 
the minds of men," as Elliott R. Goodman describes it in his illumi-
nating book on the subject. Thus what we Americans like to call 
the Free World is confronted by a Soviet Russian plan for a uni-
versal political order, or world state, deriving its claim to validity 
from the patronage of a triumphant, as they think, international 
Communist Party. 
In the eyes of its votaries this Communist world state is no idle 
dream of impractical visionaries. It is, they believe, the natural 
and inevitable result of the operation of the basic economic forces 
in the contemporary world. The destiny of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, as the Russian Communists see it, is to become 
the vital center of an expanding system of Communist states until 
the Communist world order embraces all mankind. Khrushchev 
professes to have convinced himself that this Communist world 
system can be realized without resort to international war as the 
instrument of Communist foreign policy. This is the essence of 
his recent devotion to the cause of "peaceful coexistence". (See 
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, Twelfth Report, 
June 1960) 
The Chinese Communists also presumably see something like 
the Russian vision of a new world order. The idea of a world state 
is certainly no radical novelty to the heirs of the Confucian politi-
cal tradition. From the classical Chinese point of view the massive 
and durable Celestial Empire was a universal political order, in 
which there was room for any number of imperial 'provinces and 
tributary kingdoms, but no comprehension of the sovereign equal-
ity of states as exhibited in the political system of the modem 
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West. The Chinese Communist leaders, however, boasting the 
superior purity of their brand of Marxism-Leninism, may question 
the feasibility of achieving world-wide supremacy for their ideal 
world order without resort to sanguinary wars against the "Free 
World." It is "peaceful coexistence" prior to the achievement of the 
Communist world order, rather than the ultimate world order 
itself, that seems to them the visionary dream. 
It "is not surprising that the Russian and Chinese Communists 
should have difficulty in understanding one another. Karl Marx 
himself, whatever may be the merits of his "dialectical material-
ism", regarded as a key to the interpretation of history, was grossly 
misled concerning the history of China. In his early life he acted 
for a time as a European correspondent for the N ew York Tribune. 
An article of his, written in the 1850s amidst the great Taiping 
rebellion, which then threatened to overthrow the Manchu Dy:. 
nasty and restore the Empire on a more modern basis, forecast 
the development of revolution in China in harmony with the 
predicted course of the revolutionary movement in the West. (See 
N. Y. Daily Tribune, June 14, 1853, p. 4) But the Taiping leaders, 
though scoring sensational victories over the imperial forces, 
proved incapable of u~ing to any good purpose the power which 
they wrenched from th<i' feeble grasp of the Manchu rulers. The 
Taiping, or "Great Peace", rebellion was eventually put down by 
the Chinese themselves with an assist from the British and French. 
The time came when Stalin was able to dabble actively in Chinese 
revolutionary politics, but neither in his dealings with the Chinese 
Nationalists under Sun Yat-sen nor in those with the Communists 
under Mao Tse-tung did he show an intelligent grasp of the 
Chinese situation. His eventual alliance with the latter was more 
a marriage of convenience than an association based on a genuine 
sense of community of purpose and principle. 
Moreover, there is nothing in either dialectical materialism or 
the Confucian tradition to determine whether the capital of the 
new Marxist-Leninist world order should be "in Moscow or in 
Peking. There is also nothing in either of these sys1tems of political 
philosophy to determine which group of Communist politicians, 
the Russian or the Chinese, possesses the better claim to the 
leadership of the international Communist Party. A third of man-
kind may share the Marxist-Leninist vision of a Communist system 
of world order, but happily for the other two-thirds the former do 
not share a common plan for realizing their vision. 
The response of the Free World to the challenge of the Com-
munist vision is the organization of peace under the Charter of the 
United Nations. The Russian and Chinese ideas of a universal 
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political order, whatever the difficulties may be in the way of their 
practical realization, constitute a powerful weapon in the present 
contest for the mastery of men's minds. Only a better idea of the 
form which a universal reign of law might take would be a more 
powerful weapon. The essence of such an idea is embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations. The question remains: How serv-
iceable can the United Nations be, regarded as an instrument of 
the purposes and principles of those who wish to create the kind 
of world order described in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter? 
The practical importance of this question in the development of 
American foreign policy has led to numerous appraisals of the past 
success and future promise of the United Nations. Some of these 
appraisals possess exceptional interest because of the i,mportance 
of the persons who have made them. For instance, President 
Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals devoted the second 
part of its Report, published in 1960, to what it called «Goals 
Abroad." Goal number 15 related to the United Nations. «A key 
goal in the pursuit of a vigorous and effective United States 
foreign policy," the Report declared, His the preservation and 
strengthening of the United Nations. Over the next decade," the 
Report continued, Hit will be under tremendous strain. Howev~r, 
it remains the chief instrument available for building a genuine 
community of nations." 
Does this mean that building a genuine community of nations 
is also a key goal of American foreign policy? The Report does not 
clearly say. The Commission on National Goals did make some 
significant observations concerning the United Nations. «It must 
be recognized," the Report conceded, «that the United Nations 
provides a forum for Soviet propaganda and tactics of dissension, 
and an opportunity for Soviet vetoes to block or delay world ad-
vances. Nevertheless, we should give the world community, as 
represented by the United Nations, our steadfast support." But, in 
giving such support, what kind of organization for the world com-
munity is our national goal? What do we really wish to make out 
of the United Nations? The Commission did not say. 
The Rockefeller Panel Reports, published in 1961 under the 
general title, «Prospect for America", proceed in a similar vein. 
Report Number I, entitled HThe Mid-Century Challenge to Ameri-
can Foreign Policy," prepared by Panel I under the chairmanship 
of Dean Rusk, now Secretary of State, is somewhat more specific. 
«The United Nations," this Report declares, «is proof of our con-
viction, that problems which are of world-wide impact must be 
dealt with through institutions global in their scope." The authors 
of this Report presumably believed that the world community 
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should possess an organization universal in membership and op-
eration. But what needs to be done to enable the existing United 
Nations Organization to fulfill its necessary and proper mission? 
Rockefeller Panel Report Number I does not clearly answer this 
question. 
This Rockefeller Panel Report discusses the problem in an inter-
esting and imaginative way, though the end of the discussion is 
still inconclusive. uThe United Nations," it declares, ~~stands, 
finally, as a symbol of th~ world order that will one day be built. 
The United States has need of symbols as well as power in its 
foreign policy." This is forthright as far as it goes, but it does not 
go far enough. Cannot more be said now concerning the nature of 
the world order that the Free World will one day build and of the 
preparatory work that may be done in the immediate future? 
A more recent appraisal of the United Nations, which gains 
significance from the position of its author as well as from the 
cogency of its argument, is that by the chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, J. William Fulbright, published 
in the October, 1961, issue of ~~Foreign Affairs" under the title, 
"For a Concert of Free Nations". Senator Fulbright was an early 
leader in the movement to put a stronger general international 
organization in place of the defunct League of Nations and has 
been a sturdy supporter of the United Nations through all its trials 
and tribulations in the years since its foundation. Observing the 
weakness of the United Nations, regarded as a peace-keeping 
institution, in consequence of the failure of the super-powers to 
collaborate in the Security Council in accordance with the hopes 
of the founders, the Senator concludes that common fears of a 
nuclear holocaust are not enough to ensure the success of a gen-
uine system of collective security on a world-wide scale. There 
must be, he believes, a more rational sense of community based 
on voluntary and unconstrained acceptance of common purposes 
and common principles. There must be, as he puts it, ~~a com-
munity rooted not only in common peril-but also in common values 
and aspirations." 
Senator Fulbright's analysis of the problem of establishing a 
viable world order probes deeply into the nature of world politics. 
"There is no necessary correlation," he declares, CCbetween human 
need and human capacity." Successful political institutions re-
quire, he believes, ~~the positive force of a sense of community." 
He is sanguine enough to observe that ~~a genuine community is 
painfully emerging in the Western world." He would make this 
emerging community ua realistic concert of free nations." He does 
not profess to know in precisely what form this "concert of free 
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nations" should be organized. He does concede that the objective 
of building a cohesive community of free nations "should be pur-
sued as far as possible within the United Nations." 
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace agrees with 
Senator Fulbright in emphasizing the importance of a sense of 
community of purpose and of principle among those who would 
build a durable and eHective system of peace-making and peace-
keeping. It agrees also with his conclusion that the eHort to imple-
ment such a sense of community should be pursued as far as 
possible within the United Nations. It is convinced further that 
the most promising concert of free nations consists of those United 
Nations Member States which are strongly committed to the pur-
poses and principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the United 
Nations Charter. But the Commission sees no advantage at this 
time in trying to organize this particular community of free na-
tions outside the United Nations Organization. On the contrary, 
we believe, the greatest influence of this "concerf' can be expected 
to develop under wise leadership within the General Assembly 
and the Councils of that Organization. 
The achievements of the United Nations Organization in its first 
seventeen years have been radically diHerent from the expecta-
tions or hopes of the founders. Outstanding has been the develop-
ment of a new and better system of tutelage for the states which 
have sprung from the liquidation of obsolete colonial empires. 
Colonialism proved to be a permanently unacceptable method of 
applying the technical skills and free capital of the more advanced 
societies to the_ development of those less advanced in the 'use of 
modern science and technology. Trusteeship under the United 
Nations was a useful temporary aid in the adjustment of older 
societies to modern conditions. Membership in the United Na-
tions, however, on terms of political equality with the original 
members clears the way for the most eHective utilization of 
modern ideas and techniques. 
Membership in the United Nations for these new states promises 
enjoyment of the basic human ·rights and fundamental freedoms 
which the Charter seeks to extend to all peoples everywhere 
regardless of race, color, previous condition, or present lack of 
military power. It does not guarantee immediate full enjoyment 
of these rights and freedoms. But it does create better oppor-
tunities for their enjoyment with less risk of international conflict 
than during the period when the Western nations themselves were 
struggling to obtain these same rights and freedoms. This achieve-
ment means a better hope for all of maintaining a world environ-
ment in which free societies can prosper. It holds the promise of a 
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firmer foundation for the further development of the United N a-
tions Organization itself. 
Another important achievement of the United Nations Organi-
zation has been the improvement of the facilities for the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes. If the possibility of peaceful 
change be, as John Foster Dulles intimated, the fundamental pre-
requisite for peace, then the developing practice of parliamentary 
diplomacy offers the promise of a brighter future for the relations 
between the powers. The Commission to Study the Organization 
of Peace believes that the United Nations is already much more 
than a symbol. The Commission believes that it is indeed a veri-
table power in world politics, and that there is useful work to be 
done now in further developing the Organization to the end that 
those international statesmen who speak in its name may exert an 
even greater influence over the course of events. We Americans 
have been strangely reluctant to profess our intention of establish-
ing a more rational and more peaceful world order as the logical 
as well as desirable culmination of the American way of life, but 
the record of peaceful changes already promoted by various pro-
ceedings at the United Nations forbids ignoring the latent possi~ 
bilities in this field of world politics. 
It is significant that most of the occasions on which the United 
Nations has employed military forces or observers in its peace-
making or peace-keeping activities have arisen in connection with 
the problems of newly liberated colonial dependencies. Korea, 
Palestine, the Congo: all were situations in which the peace of the 
world was threatened by the unwillingness or inability of newly 
established authorities to keep their own peace. It is not necessary 
to apportion the blame for these situations among the various 
powers claiming an interest in them. It is enough that the situa-
tions grew out of operations concerned with the liquidation of 
colonial empires. The greatest service of the United Nations Or-
ganization in the prevention of war up to now has been to prevent 
war between major powers by stopping conHicts between lesser 
peoples, with little or no experience as independent states, before 
they could spread beyond their own borders. 
If building a genuine community of nations is a key goal of 
American foreign policy, the transformation of the United Nations 
into a strong and universal organization, which can hold its place 
at the vital center of the modern world, is an urgent task of states-
manship, especially American statesmanship. For peace, as Presi-
dent Kennedy said in his masterly address to the United Nations 
General Assembly, September 25, 1961, C<:is not solely a matter of 
military or technical problems-it is primarily a matter of politics 
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and people.n He continued to point out the right conclusions from 
contemporary developments in the evolution of the United Na-
tions in his State of the Union Address to the Congress on January 
11, 1962. "We may not always agree with every detailed action 
taken by every officer of the United Nations," he declared, "or with 
every voting majority. But as an institution it should have in the 
future, as it has had in the past since its inception, no stronger or 
more faithful member than the United States of America." 
11. The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, there-
fore, recommends finally that the Free World support the further 
development of the United Nations Organization in pursuit of a 
goal in sharp contrast to the Communist vision of a system of 
world order. We believe with President Kennedy that "in the de-
velopment of this Organization rests the only true alternative to 
war; and war appeals no longer as a rational alternative." The 
general direction which the further development of the United 
Nations Organization should take was carefully considered by the 
Commission in its Fourteenth Report, published in January of this 
year. We think that the Organization should be "a dynamic instru-
ment of Governments," implementing the purposes and principles 
set forth in the Charter. It should be made capable of serving 
efficiently the kind of world described in Articles 1 and 2. 
12. The C ommi~sion in its earlier reports has offered many 
specific suggestions for the strengthening and further development 
of the United Nations Organization. (See especially our Reports 
numbered 10, 11, and 13.) It renews these recommendations here, 
Weare convinced that a natural principle of the political order 
calls for the establishment of a world-wide reign of law based on 
the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations and realizable only through universal membership in the 
United Nations. 
The new view of this old American goal has been well expressed 
in a recent address by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Speaking on 
November 28, 1961 before the Academy of Political Science in 
N ew York City, he said: "Our foreign policy is directed toward 
building the kind of world community called for in the United 
Nations Charter-a community of independent nations, each free 
to work out its own institutions as it sees fit, but cooperating effec-
tively in matters of common interest.'> He added: "We think of 
'community> as the context within which men can join together 
to build a more adequate home for the race within the physical 
environment, and the context within which man must find an 
answer to his propensity for self-extermination ... The President · 
has reminded us that 'there cannot be an American solution to 
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every world problem.' The world community, which is a scarlet 
thread of American policy, is a necessary goal for all nations who 
wish to be both secure and free, whether allied or neutral, whether 
Western or non-Western, and whatever their stage of economic 
development. The building of that community is the main objec-
tive of man." 
This, Secretary Rusk declared, "is no triVial goal." The Commis-
sion to Study the Organization of Peace agrees. And we suggest 
that making the United Nations as nearly as practicable a uni-
versal organization is an important next step in the direction in 
which all for whom Secretary Rusk spoke wish to go. 
The following members of the Commission have signed this 
Report. Signature means approval of the general principles out-
lined in the Report, but not necessarily of all the details. Specific 
reservations in a-few cases are noted below. 
James T. Shotwell, Honorary Chairman 
Arthur N. Holcombe, Chairman 
G. Hinman Barrett 
Cyril J. Bath 
Clarence A. Berdahl 
Donald C. Blaisdell 
Roy Blough 
John R. Boettiger 
Charles G. Bolte 
Frank G. Boudreau 
David F. Cavers 
Waldo Chamberlin 
Daniel S. Cheever 
Ben M. Cherrington 
John L. Childs 
Benjamin V. Cohen 
J. B. Condliffe1 
Edward A. Conway, S.J.2 
N orman Cousins 
Royden Dangerfield 
Oscar A. de Lima 
Albert I. Edelman 
Clark M .. Eichelberger 
Rupert Emerson 
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Charles G. Fenwick 
Edgar J. Fisher 




Leland M. Goodrich 
Frank P. Graham 
Ernst B. HaaiJ 
J. Eugene Harley4 
Donald S. Harrington 
H. Field Haviland, Jr. 
Walter D. Head 
John H. Herz 
Willard N. Hogan 
H. Stuart Hughes 
Erling M. Hunt 
Samuel Guy Inman 
Anne Hartwell J ohnstone5 
Hans Kohn 
Joseph P. Lash 
Walter H. C. Laves 
Gerard J. Mangone 
Boyd A. Martin 
Charles E. Martin 
Herbert L. May 
Marion H. McVitty 
Hugh Moore 
Laura Puffer Morgan 
Ine Nijuis 
Robert E. Osgood 
Ernest Minor Patterson 
Josephine W. Pomerance 
James P. Pope 
Charles C. Price 
Leland Rex Robinson6 
J. William Robinson 
Eleanor Roosevelt 
Paul E. Smith 
Louis B. Sohn 
Eugene Staley 
C. M. Stanley 
John G. Stoessinger 
Arthur Sweetser 
Obert C. Tanner 
Amos E. Taylor 
Amry Vandenbosch 
James P. Warburg 
Francis O. Wilcox7 
Richard R. Wood 
Quincy Wright 
1. I could not support Recommendation 8 in its present form, whioh is 
vague and liable to be misread. I could support a rewording along the 
following lines: 
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace recommends, 
therefore, that the activities of the United Nations Organization and 
its specialized agencies be extended vigorously in the preparation of 
programs of internal improvements in underdeveloped Member States 
and that the fullest use be made of the credit of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development in the money markets of the world. 
]. B. Condliffe 
2. With reservations on Recommendation No.3. 
E. A. Conway, S.]. 
3. Does not agree with Recommendations Nos. 2, 4 and 11. 
Ernst B. Haas 
4. In view of recent developments in Southeast Asia, the India-Chinese 
Territorial dispute, and ideological differences regarding the inevitability 
of war, Communist China must have more time to display its attachment 
to the principles of peace and to those of the United Nations Charter as 
conditions for admission to the United Nations. 
]. Eugene Harley 
5. With reservations only as to the timing and the intent of applicants 
for membership among the "divided" nations. 
Anne Hartwell] ohnstone 
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6. Immediate efforts are imperative toward some political modus vivendi 
with the Peiping regime and the establishment of orderly contacts within or 
through the United Nations and its associated bodies. 
However, the two China concept approved in principle in this Fifteenth 
Report spotlights several acute problems in whose resolution some progress 
should be made before admission of the Mainland government becomes 
feasible or desirable. 
Among these are the open belligerence of Peiping and the occasional 
bellicose utterances from high quarters in Taipei, -perhaps accentuated by 
the obvious entanglement of military strategy and humanitarian considera-
tions in our aid; the provincial, rather than national, status imposed upon 
the people of Taiwan by the present set-up of the Nationalist Government, 
and by the uncompromising attitude of Peiping; and the structure of the 
Security Council after the proposed admission of the "Peoples Republic": 
i.e. whether the peoples of China should then be represented by permanent 
membership in the Council, and if so, by which "China." 
In all this the wishes of the people of Formosa should be consulted, their 
protection and development underscored, and continued priority given to 
the build-up of political and economic standards offering potent competition 
in an environment of peaceful coexistence. 
At no point should any question be raised as to continued direct repre-
sentation of Taiwan in the United Nations-a condition which the "Peoples 
Republic" is not now prepared to accept. This -responsible participation 
of the Nationalist Government, however, calls for far greater dedication to 
the acceptance, care and resettlement of refugees from Mainland China 
than has to this time characterized the Taiwan regime. 
Leland Rex Robinson 
7. With reservations on Recommendation No.3. 
Francis O. Wilcox 
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APPENDIX A 
Legal Obstacles to Universal Membership 
QUINCY WRIGHT 
"Membership in the United Nations," according to Article 4 of 
the Charter, "is open to all other peace-loving states which accept 
the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judg-
ment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these 
o bliga tions." 
Thus, there are five qualifications: (1) that the applicant for 
membership must be a state; (2) that it must be peace-loving; 
(3) tha~ it must accept the obligations contained in the Charter; 
( 4) that it must be able to carry out these obligations; and (5) 
that it must be willing to carry them out. These are the only provi-
sions in the Charter concerning eligibility for membership. 
The authority to interpret these qualifications is specified only 
with regard to the last two; they are to be interpreted by "the 
judgment of the organization." It is not stated by what organ the 
United Nations will express judgment, but since the Charter says 
that "the admission of any such state to membership in the United 
Nations will be affected by a decision of the General Assembly 
upon the recommendation of the Security Council," it would ap-
pear that this judgment is to be expressed by these orgqns. Fur-
thermore, it would seem that the interpretation of the first three 
qualifications was intended to be made by judgment of the same 
organs. 
The International Court of Justice gave an Advisory Opinion in 
1950 at the request of the General Assembly, to the effect that 
members of the United Nations ought not to guide their judgment 
when voting in these organs by qualifications other than those 
explicitly mentioned in the Charter-particularly that they ought 
not to utilize their·votes as an element in a bargain. The Opinion 
was asked because the Soviet Union had stated explicitly that it 
would not vote for the admission of Italy unless other states voted 
for certain Soviet satellites. Since, as pointed out by some mem-
bers of the Court, a state is under no obligation to express the 
motives for its vote and there is no procedure for overriding its 
vote, the qualifications can actually be no more than subjective or 
moral limitations under member's political discretion when voting 
in the General Assembly or the Security Council. It is olear that 
a state excluded by a 'vote so taken cannot appeal to the Inter-
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national Court of Justice and gain admission to the United Nations 
on the ground that its admission had been prevented by an im-
properly motivated vote. Nor is there any procedure for declaring 
that votes which have admitted a new member are void on the 
ground that the state in question actually lacks the Charter quali-
fications. Indeed, it is clear that subsequent to this Advisory 
Opinion of the Court, many states have become members of the 
United Nations on the basis of votes motivated by political bar-
gaining between the two sides in the Cold War. We must conclude 
that when votes for a new member ignore the qualifications of the 
Charter or are motivated by consideration not authorized in the 
Charter, this does not reduce their effectiveness. The Charter 
qualifications are merely appeals to the conscience or common 
sense of the voting members. 
In its Advisory Opinion the Court also dealt with procedural 
matters, holding that a favorable Hdecision" of the General Assem-
bly was not sufficient to confer membership unless there was also 
favorable ~'recommendation" by the Security Council. This issue 
had been controversial because an opinion of a committee at the 
San Francisco Conference had taken the contrary view, that while 
a recommendation of the Security Council must be given, the 
General Assembly could admit a state even if the recommendation 
were adverse .( 9th Report pp. 21-22). This Opinion of the Court 
was important because it had been assumed that a "recommenda-
tion" of the Security Council on this matter would not be proce-
dural but would constitute a substantive "decision," subject under 
Article 27 of the Charter to veto by the permanent members. -Thus, 
although not explicitly so provided in the Charter, the admission 
of new members has been subject to great-power veto. 
Leaving aside the lack of sanctions to enforce the Charter quali-
fications for membership, what do they mean? 
1. What is a, state? International law recognizes the need for 
both condition of fact-the independent governriient of a popula-
tion inhabiting a defined territory; and a condition of law-gen-
eral recognition of this fact of prolonged conscious acquiescence 
in it by most existing states. The relative weights given to these 
two aspects of statehood divide the advocates of the "declaratory" 
and the Hconstitutive" theories of recognition. Both hold that some 
recognition is necessary for an entity to be a state. A small com-
munity on a Pacific Island or a native chieftainship in Central New 
Guinea, isolated from any contact with the states of the world, 
would not under either theory be a state in the sense of existing 
international law. 
The advocates of the declaratory theory, however, hold that 
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when a state exists in fact with some external contacts, it is a state 
in the sense of international law and recognition is merely declara-
tory of that situation. 
The advocates of the constitutive theory, on the other hand, hold 
that, whatever the facts, recognition is essential, and is therefore 
"constitutive" of statehood in the legal sense. Some, who take this 
view, hold that recognition is a political act to be exercised at. 
discretion, that states may use recognition or non-recognition as 
instruments of policy, and that they may, therefore, refuse to 
recognize a state or a government formed by revolution, even 
when firmly established, and may continue to recognize the pre-
vious de iure government which may continue a ghostly existence 
in exile. Some, on the other hand, though accepting the constitu-
tive character of recognition, hold that it is a juristic act and that 
states should, in general, recognize a de facto state or government, 
or even, as maintained by the late Judge Lauterpacht, that they 
are under a legal obligation to do so. 
The United States rather consistently recognized de facto gov-
ernments after President Washington recognized the revolutionary 
government of France in 1793, although that government had 
recently sent King Louis XVI, the ally of the United States, to 
the guillotine and was considered by many conservatives in the 
United States as dangerously radical. This policy was, however, 
changed when President Wilson refused to recognize the de facto 
Mexican government of Victoriano Huerta who had aohieved his 
position by causing the assassination of his predecessor, President 
Madero. De facto ism was in fact a major element of United States 
policy set forth in the Monroe Doctrine, which warned the Euro-
. pean powers not to attempt to reestablish in Latin America the 
authority of the de iure sovereign, the King of Spain. 
Since 1913 the United States has pursued varying policies, often 
refusing to recognize de facto governments over long periods be-
cause it did not like their ideology or their practices (as in the 
cases of Soviet Russia and Communist China) or because it hoped 
to reunite divided states such as Germany, Korea and Vietnam. 
Such refusals to recognize, from considerations of national policy, 
are to be distinguished from the non-recognition of new states 
arising from territorial transfers effected by the use of armed force 
in violation of int~rnational obligations. This principle was as-
serted by Secretary Stimson after Japan's conquest of Manchuria 
in 1931, and was supported by both the League of Nations and 
the United Nations. It was followed in regard to Mussolini's con-
quest of Ethiopia and Hitler's conquest in Europe. Such depar-
tures from de facto ism, whether on grounds of policy or principle, 
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should be distinguished from non-recognitions arising from gen-
uine doubt as to whether a state or government is actually estab-
lished with sufficient material power, stable boundaries and moral 
support or acquiescence of its population to make it a state in fact. 
Doubtless there is always justification in delaying recognition of a 
revolutionary government until sufficient time has passed to make 
its continuance highly probable; but when that probability exists, 
it would appear that recognition makes for stability and accord 
with international law provided that change has not resulted from 
external aggression. Even in the latter case, it would seem that the 
United Nations might eventually recommend recognition of the 
change if it deemed it on the whole beneficial. As Judge Lauter-
pacht suggested, there must be a method for balancing the prin-
ciple jus ex injuria non oritur with the principle ex facto jus oritur. 
Non-recognition of a well-established state or government usu-
ally amounts to a denial of the right of the people concerned to 
choose their own government and to a c9ndemnation of a state's 
attitude in international relations without a hearing. Non-recogni-
tion in such circumstances, therefore, seems contrary to the basic 
democratic principle that government should exist by the consent 
of the governed and to the basic principle of justice that no one 
shall be condemned without a hearing. 
The United Nations should observe the same principles, par-
ticularly because-as Secretary-General Trygve Lie pointed out in 
the spring of 1950 when urging the representation of Mainland 
China-a member of the United Nations cannot meet its responsi-
bilities under the Charter unless the government which represents 
it actually controls the territory of the state. Furthermore the 
United Nations cannot adequately perform its functions unless all 
existing states are members. 
2. What is the meaning of cCpeace-loving'? The Charter makes 
it clear that this phrase referred to states which had been at war 
against the Axis powers. Article 3 says, ccThe original members 
of the United Nations shall be the states which, having partici-
pated in the United Nations Conference on International Organ-
ization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Decla-
ration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present 
Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110." The Declara-
tion of January 1, 1942 was signed by the states at war with one 
or more of the Axis powers. Under the Yalta agreement only states 
which had signed this declaration were invited to the San Fran-
cisco Conference. Article 4 of the Charter implies that these 
original members were cCpeace-Ioving states" by saying that cCother 
peace-loving states" are eligible to membership. 
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To have recently been at war is an unusual conception of the 
term "peace-loving" but in view of the charges and counter-
charges of aggression made during the Cold War, it is difficult to 
reach agreement as to a definition. Each side, in charging the other 
with warlike propensities, has declared its own allegiance to the 
cause of peace. Nearly all states have participated in war in the 
past, more or less recently, more or less frequently. All regard their 
rivals of the moment as being belligerent and all regard them-
selves as champions of peace. Since the first purpose of the United 
Nations is to maintain international peace and security, it should 
perhaps be sufficient to ascribe a peace-loving character to any 
state which applies for membership in the United Nations and 
thus formally endorses this purpose. 
3. H ow can it be 'determined that a state accepts the obliga-
tions of the Charter? This phrase would in international law be 
assumed to refer to formal acceptance by the usual procedures of 
signature and ratification by the state>s duly constituted authori-
ties. It is difficult to think of any other applicable conception. 
States have not, it is true, always observed treaties which they 
have accepted by such formal process. There is even evidence that 
on occasion states have formally accepted instruments when their 
governments had no real intention of observing them. Interria-
tionallaw recognizes that formal acceptance resulting froIl} duress 
or fraud against the negotiator is not a real acceptance and renders 
the instrument voidable. The Stimson Doctrine goes further, as-
serting that duress against the state itself, as when it has been 
defeated in war, invalidates its formal acceptance of a treaty. It 
is unlikely, however, that either a government or a state will be 
coerced by force or deception to apply for membership in the 
United Nations and formally to accept the Charter. We must, 
therefore, assume that a state which has ratified the Charter by its 
constitutional procedure has "accepted" it in the sense of the 
Charter. 
4. When is a state able to carry out the obligations of the 
Charter? Fulfillment of United Nations obligations involves three 
kinds of acts: 
First: Action in the state's territory or in its ships, aircraft or 
space satellites necessary to carry o-qt obligations such as those to 
promote respect for human rights and the self -determination of 
peoples, and to promote social and economic progress in accord 
with United Nations principles and special treaties to which it is 
a party. Also in this category are obligations to see that ships, air-
craft and space satellites for which it is responsible observe inter-
national law. This may require positive action in enforcing law 
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within the State's territory and regulating its public services, or it 
may require abstention from such action as to infringe the human 
rights of its nationals and of aliens resident in its territory. Such 
capability is implied by the factual aspects of the definition of a 
state. An entity, as noted, is not a state unless a population in-
habiting a defined territory is in fact controlled by an independent 
government. There has, of course, been great variation in the 
efficiency of government and all governments have at times been 
the victims of insurrection or rebellion temporarily preventing 
the exercise of authority in a part, or even the whole, of the state's 
territory. It would appear, however, that if an entity is judged to 
be a state and is represented by its de facto government, it can 
be assumed that the government is able to fulfill its obligations 
in its territory, its ships, aircraft, and space satellites. This, of 
course, would not be true of members which are represented by 
governments which do not in fact control the state's territory. 
Second, there are the negative obligations in international rela-
tions such as to refrain from threat or use of force (Art. 2, par. 4) 
except in individual or collective self-defense against armed attack 
(Art. 51); from intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of other 
states or from violation of their territorial integrity or political 
independence (Art. 2, pars. 1, 4, 7); from assistance to a state 
found by the United Nations to be an aggressor (Art. 2, par. 5); 
or from attempting to influence the international character of the 
Secretary-General or the staff (Art. 100). Observance of such 
duties of abstention depends upon good faith (Art. 2, par. 2) . in 
the highest decision-making authority and proper instruction of 
lesser officials. All states have the ability to fulfill obligations of 
this type if they have the will. 
The third type of action required is that necessary to fulfill posi-
tive obligations for settling disputes peacefully, for supporting the 
United Nations as an organization, and for assisting it in collec-
tive security and other operations in foreign territory in fulfilment 
of its purposes and responsibilities. These obligations are of three 
types, financial, civil and military. The Charter authorizes the 
General Assembly to approve the budget and to apportion it 
among the members (Art. 17) and payment of the amount appor-
tioned is an obligation sanctioned by suspension of voting privi-
leges (Art. 19). This applies only to the regular budget. Extraordi-
nary expenses as for refugees, economic assistance, and policing 
activities, not made part of the regular budget (as were the Congo 
operations), are sustained by voluntary contributions. 
While it is conceivable that the General Assembly might so ap-
pI:ove and apportion a budget as to impose financial obligations 
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upon certain members beyond their capacity to pay, no such 
danger has appeared on the horizon. The regular budget of the 
United Nations has been less than one-tenth of one per cent of 
the total governmental expenditures of the members and the ap-
portionment has been' carefully geared to the capacity of the mem-
bers. They vary from one-third paid by the United States to a 
fraction of one per cent paid by the smaller states. While there 
have been delinquencies in payment, these have been due to delay 
in legi~lative appropriations, to temporary financial difficulties, 
which the General Assembly considers before imposing sanctions 
(Art. 19) or to political opposition to the purpose of the appro-
priati.on as by the Soviet Union and France in refusing to pay their 
apportionments for the United Nations Force in the Congo in 
1961. 
The members are expected to send representatives to the meet-
ings of United Nations organs and this is made an explicit obliga-
tion of members of the .security Council. To facilitate prompt 
meetings "each member of the Security Council shaH for this pur-
pose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization." 
(Art. 28). On several occasions members have failed to observe 
this obligation by absenting themselves for longer or shorter pe-
riods from Security Council meetings. Members are expected to 
permit the Secretary -General to recruit his staff from among their 
. nationals but the only obligation of members in respect to the Sec-
retary-General and staff is the negative one already referred 
to (Art. 100). While members are obliged to settle disputes by 
peaceful means (Art. 2, par. 3) and to utilize United Nations pro-
cedures to this end, none of these procedures, except for states 
which have accepted the optional clause of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, goes beyond recommendation, 
carrying out of which is voluntary. The obligation, therefore, is 
to bargain in good faith coupled with the negative obligation to 
refrain from nonpacific means of settlement. Participation by 
members in civil and military operations of the United Nations 
in foreign territory is voluntary. 
Each member, while under a general obligation to assist the 
United Nations in collective security operations (Art. 2, par. 5) 
and to carry out decisions of the Security Council (Arts. 25, 48, 
49) is free to specify the forces it will contribute to such enter-
prises by prior agreement as provided in Articles 43 and 45 of the 
Charter or by ad hoc contributions of forces as by certain states 
in the Palestine, Korean, Suez and Congo operations. No state can 
be required to contribute beyond its own estimate of its ability. 
It therefore appears that insofar as the members of the United 
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Nations are states represented by their governments, they can be 
assumed to be able to carry out United Nations obligations. There 
are, doubtless, present members which do not entirely conform to 
these conditions, as, for example, the Ukraine and Byelorussia 
which, as members of the Soviet Union, lack independent au-
thority over their territories; or China which is represented by a 
government that controls little, if indeed any, Chinese territory. 
5. When is a state willing to carry out its obligations? This 
qualification adds little, if anything, to the requirements that an 
applicant must accept the obligations of the Charter. No test of 
willingness to fulfill obligations beyond formal affirmation of SJ.lch 
willingness by ratifying the Charter is available. An inquiry into 
the motivation of the various persons taking part in the treaty-
making process would not be feasible. 
It would thus appear that any state which, by applying for 
membership, indicates its readiness to ratify the Charter, can be 
deemed peace-loving and able and willing to carry out Charter 
obligations. The only issue on which judgments may properly 
differ is whether the applicant is really a state. To determine this 
it is relevant to consider such questions as the habitual authority 
of the government over its population, the degree of popular sup-
port for or acquiescence in this government, the definition of the 
boundaries of its territory, the efficiency of its legal and adminis-
trative system in maintaining order, prevailing conceptions of 
justice, the stability and adequacy of its economy to sustain its 
population, and the extent and peaceful character of its foreign 
relations. 
Thus I come to the considered conclusion that there are no legal 
obstacles to admitting all genuine states to the United Nations. 
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APPENDIX B 
The following table shows the distribution of votes in the Six-
teenth General Assembly of the United Nations on some leading 
roll-calls in which the United States and the Soviet Union voted 
on opposite sides. It is designed to illustrate some political traits 
of the underdeveloped Member States.-The Member States in the 
first class are those of advanced industrialization and/ or high 
production per capita. The second class contains Member States 
occupying an intermediate position in the scale of economic de-
velopment. The underdeveloped Member States are distributed 
among the principal geographic regions and are listed according 
to the rate of contributions to the revenues of the UN Organiza-
tion. In general the Member States classified as underdeveloped 
report an annual production of less than $S.OO per capita. Many 
of them produce less than $1.00 per capita per annum. The classi-
fication is based on findings of the United Nations Special Fund 
and of the Committee on Contributions. 
The roll-calls took place on December 15, 1961, December 20, 
1961, and January SO, 1962, respectively. The first was on a Resolu-
tion to seat representatives of Communist China in the United 
Nations, which was strongly supported by the Soviet Union; the 
second, on a Resolution to authorize the United Nations to borrow 
two hundred million dollars, strongly supported by the United 
States; the third, on a Resolution relating to the problem of 
Angola, strongly supported by the Soviet Union. The first and 
third of these Resolutions were defeated; the second was adopted. 
RATE OF POPULATION DATE OF RESOLUTIONS 
NAME OF STATE ASSESSMENT (MILLIONS) ADMISSION 1 2 3 
I. INDUSTRIALIZED ~~HIGH-PRODUCTION" MEMBER STATES (16) 
1. United States 32.02 179.0 1945 N Y N 
2. Soviet Union 14.97 210.0 1945 Y N Y 
3. Ukraine 1.98 41.9 1945 Y N Y 
4. Byelorussia .52 8.1 1945 Y N Y 
5. United Kingdom 7.58 52.1 1945 Y Y N 
6. France 5.94 45.0 1945 N N N 
7. Canada 3.12 17.4 1945 N Y N 
8. Australia 1.66 10.0 1945 N Y N 
9. Sweden 1.30 7.4 1946 Y Y N 
10. Belgium 1.20 9.1 1945 N N N 
11. Czechoslovakia 1.17 13.5 1945 Y N Y 
12. Netherlands 1.01 11.3 1945 A Y N 
13. Denmark .58 4.5 1945 Y Y N 
14. Norway .45 3.5 1945 Y Y N 
15. New Zealand .41 2.3 1945 N Y N 
16. Luxembourg .05 0.32 1945 N Y N 
Totals 73.96 8/ 7/ 1 10/ 6/ 0 4/12 / 0 
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RATE OF POPULATION DATE OF RESOLUTIONS 
NAME OF STATE ASSESSMENT (MILLIONS) ADMISSION 1 2 3 
II. INTERMEDIATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (17) 
1. Japan 2.27 92.7 1956 N Y N 
2. Italy 2.24 49.0 1955 N Y N 
3. Poland 1.28 29.2 1945 Y N Y 
4. Argentina 1.01 20.6 1945 N Y N 
5. itain .86 29.9 1955 N A N 
6. untary .56 9.9 1955 Y N Y 
7. Sout Mrica .53 14.4 1945 N A N 
8. Venezuela .52 6.5 1945 N Y N 
9. Austria .45 7.0 1955 A Y N 
10. Finland .37 4.4 1955 Y Y N 
11. Chile .26 7.5 1945 N Y N 
12. Cuba .22 6.6 1945 Y N Y 
13. Israel .15 2.0 1949 A Y A 
14. Ireland .14 2.8 1955 N Y N 
15. Uruguay .11 2.7 1945 N A N 
16. Lebanon .05 1.5 1945 A Y A 
17. Iceland .04 0.17 1946 A Y A 
Totals 11.06 4/9/4 11/3/3 3/11/3 
III. UNDERDEVELOPED MEMBER STATES (71) 
A. EASTERN AND SOUTHERN ASIA (13) 
1. China 4.57 1945 N A N 
Taiwan 10.2 
Mainland 669. 
2. India 2.03 402. 1945 Y A Y 
3. Indonesia .45 90.3 1950 Y Y Y 
4. Pakistan .42 86.8 1947 Y Y A 
5. Phillippines .40 24:7 1945 N A N 
6. Thailand .16 21.8 1946 N Y N 
7. Malaya .13 6.7 1957 N Y A 
8. Ceylon .09 9.6 1955 Y Y A 
9. Burma .07 20.4 1948 Y Y A 
10. Cambodia .04 4.8 1955 Y A A 
11. Laos .04 1.7 1955 N Y A 
12. Nepal .04 9.0 1955 Y Y A 
13. Mongolia1 1.06 1961 Y N Y 
Totals 8.44 8/5/0 8/1/4 3/3/7 
B. LATIN AMERICA (15) 
1. Brazil 1.03 64.2 1945 N A N 
2. Mexico .74 33.3 1945 N A N 
3. Colombia .26 13.8 1945 N Y N 
4. Peru .10 10.5 1945 N Y N 
5. Ecuador .06 4.1 1945 N A N 
6. Dominican 
Republic .05 2.9 1945 N A N 
7. Guatemala .05 3.6 1945 N Y N 
8. Bolivia .04 3.4 1945 N Y A 
9. Costa Rica .04 1.1 1945 N A N 
10. EI Salvador .04 2.5 1945 N A N 
11. Haiti .04 3.4 1945 N A N 
12. Honduras .04 1.9 1945 N A N 
13. Nicaragua .04 1.4 1945 N Y N 
14. Panama .04 1.0 1945 N Y N 
15. Paraguay .04 1.7 1945 N Y N 
Totals 2.61 0/15/0 7/0/8 0/14/1 
1 Scale of assessment for Member States admitted by Sixteeuth General ~ssembly not yet determined. 
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RATE OF POPULATION DATE OF RESOLUTIONS 
NAME OF STATE ASSESSMENT (MILLIONS) ADMISSION I 2 3 
C. SOUTHWESTERN ASIA AND NORTHERN AFRICA (12) 
I. Turk1 .40 27.8 1945 N Y N 
2. Unite Arab2 
Republic .30 25.4 1945 Y A Y 
3. Iran .20 20.1 1945 N Y N 
4. Morocco .14 10.5 1956 Y Y Y 
5. Iraq .09 6.9 1945 Y A Y 
6. Syria 4.5 1945 Y A A 
7. Saudi Arabia .07 6.0 1945 A A A 
8. Afghanistan .05 13.0 1946 Y A A 
9. Tunisia .05 3.9 1956 A Y A 
10. Jordan .04 1.6 1955 N A A 
II. Libya .04 1.1 1955 N A A 
12. Yemen .04 4.5 1947 Y A A 
Totals 1.42 6/4/2 4/0/8 3/2/7 
D. EUROPE (7) 
I. Yugoslavia .38 18.4 1945 Y Y Y 
2. Romania .32 18.2 1955 Y N Y 
3. Greece .23 8.2 1945 N A N 
4. Bulgaria .20 7.8 1955 Y N Y 
5. Portugal .16 9.0 1955 A A A 
6. Albania .04 1.5 1955 Y N Y 
7. Cyprus .04 0.56 1960 A Y A 
Totals 1.37 4/1/2 2/3/2 4/1/2 
E. TROPICAL AFRICA (24) 
I. Nigeria .21 33.7 1960 A Y A 
2. Ghana .09 6.7 1957 Y Y Y 
3. Congo (Leopold-
ville) .07 13.8 1960 A A A 
4. Sudan .07 11.4 1956 Y A Y 
5. Ethiopia .05 21.8 1945 Y Y Y 
6. Senegal .05 2.3 1960 N Y Y 
7. Cameroun .04 3.2 1960 N Y Y 
8. Central African 
Rep. .04 1.2 1960 A A A 
9. Chad .04 2.6 1960 A Y A 
10. Congo (Brazza-
ville) .04 0.8 1960 A A A 
II. Dahomey .04 1.7 1960 A A A 
12. Gabon .04 0.4 1960 N A A 
13. Guinea .04 2.7 1958 Y Y Y 
14. Ivory Coast .04 3.1 1960 A Y A 
15. Liberia .04 1.2 1945 N Y A 
16. Madagascar .04 5.2 1960 N Y A 
17. Mali .04 4.3 1960 Y Y Y 
18. Niger .04 2.5 1960 A Y A 
19. Somalia .04 2.0 1960 Y Y Y 
20. Togo .04 1.1 1960 A A A 
21. ~per Valta .04 3.5 1960 A Y A 
22. auritania 1 0.73 1961 N Y A 
23. Sierra Leone1 2.4 1961 Y Y A 
24. Tanganyika1 9.08 1961 N A Y 
Totals 1.14 7/7/10 16/0/8 9/0/15 
Y-Yes 
N-No 
A - absent or abstain 
1 Scale of assessment for Member States admitted by Sixteenth General Assembly Dot yet determined. 
2 Allocation between Syria and United Arab Republic to be determined. 
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July 1951. 
Eighth Report-Regional Arrangements for Security and the 
United Nations and Papers Presented to the Commission, 
June 1953. 
Ninth Report-Charter Review Conference and Papers Presented 
to the Commission, August 1955. 
Tenth Report-Strengthening the United Nations, Harper & 
Brothers, October 1957. 
Eleventh Report-Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age, New 
York University Press, September 1959. 
Twelfth Report-Peaceful Coexistence-A New Challenge to the 
United Nations, June 1960. 
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